Research release: 2026-09-06. Historical charts are reconstructions from revised data. Financial feeds and the frozen Nasdaq inference refresh separately; historical model fitting is not an automatic feed.
No prospective forecasts recorded yet. This record starts with newly verified data. Historical reconstructions are excluded.
Each saved Nasdaq estimate keeps its original issuance time, 13 monthly closes and frozen model. A changed input creates a separate revision. Repeated checks preserve the first record. This is an application record, not an independently timestamped registry.
These estimates are issued during their target month, before its closing outcome—not before the month starts. Collection closes before the final seven calendar days of each target month, avoiding issuance after a month-end trading close. Future evaluation must use the first issuance for each month and model; revisions are not extra trials. No prospective accuracy result is available yet, and these are not AI crash odds.
Collection paused by source failure. The latest market refresh did not succeed; retained historical inputs cannot create a new forecast.
Last successful market check: 2026-09-06 00:00:00Z. Collection runs after successful, eligible market refreshes on visits; it is not guaranteed by the hourly research schedule.
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Boom argues that concentrated ambition and funding can accelerate innovation. Track two outcomes separately: financial losses and capabilities that remain useful. For AI, compare financial exposure with useful output, sustained usage and infrastructure utilization. Lower prices can help customers while squeezing suppliers. Productive progress alone does not justify a valuation.
Inspired by Byrne Hobart and Tobias Huber’s Boom. The two-outcome lens is our application of the argument; no productive-value bonus is added to the risk score.
The supplied Boom excerpt examines Apollo as a publicly financed social bubble: political enthusiasm enabled costly overinvestment, while support later faded (zine pp. 19–21). The authors argue NASA procurement accelerated semiconductor affordability and diffusion, while acknowledging those technologies might otherwise have emerged later (pp. 30–31). They also discuss cultural legacy beyond measurable returns (pp. 32–33). These are the authors’ interpretations, not proof that every bubble produces net benefits. Boom excerpt: The Apollo Program ↗
Use dated observations with their original units. Capacity, adoption and falling unit cost are different indicators, so do not combine them into a social-value score. None identifies the counterfactual: what would have happened without excessive investment.
| Episode | Financial exposure | Observed productive evidence | What it does not establish |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI | Prospective exposure: equity investors, creditors and compute counterparties may bear losses if revenue disappoints. Company financing and compute commitments establish exposure, not realized losses. Source ↗ Source ↗ Source ↗ Source ↗ | GPT-3.5-level inference cost fell more than 280-fold, November 2022–October 2024. Source ↗ | Benchmark-matched inference cost is not full task cost, profitability or current infrastructure utilization. |
| British railways, including Ireland | The promotion boom’s expansion was associated with deteriorating shareholder value. Source ↗ | Open railway mileage rose from 2,343 in 1845 to 6,308 in 1850. Source ↗ | Physical capacity does not establish utilization or net welfare. This is Britain and Ireland, not the U.S. 1873 railway case. |
| Dotcom | Shareholders bore falling equity values; Mishkin distinguishes this episode from bubbles accompanied by marked bank deterioration. Source ↗ | U.S. high-speed internet lines grew from about 7.1 million in December 2000 to 9.6 million in June 2001. Source ↗ | An adoption count during the bust does not measure telecom asset utilization, survivor profits or economy-wide net benefit. |
The FCC counts lines or wireless channels above 200 Kbps in at least one direction, not unique people. Its rounded endpoints should not be used to override the source’s reported growth rate. The railway figures include Ireland and do not describe the US 1873 episode. No monthly series is interpolated from these observations.
Still needed for AI: paid usage and retention, cost per successful task, energized versus idle capacity, equipment resale value and economic useful life. These would help test the productive-boom hypothesis; capex announcements alone do not.
We reviewed the official synopsis and Apollo excerpt, not the full book. Public funding and overinvestment: zine pp. 19–21; semiconductor spillovers and counterfactual qualification: pp. 30–31; nonfinancial legacy: pp. 32–33. These are author interpretations, not causal estimates of the net benefit of bubbles.
Boom: Bubbles and the End of Stagnation — Stripe Press — Publisher synopsis; authors Byrne Hobart and Tobias Huber
Boom excerpt: The Apollo Program — Printed zine pp. 19–21, 30–33; PDF pages 10–11, 16–17 (one-based)
Stanford HAI — 2025 AI Index, takeaway 7 — Takeaway 7: AI becomes more efficient, affordable and accessible
Campbell and Turner (2015), Managerial failure in mid-Victorian Britain? — Table 5, printed p. 44 / PDF page 45; table draws on Parliamentary Papers; includes Ireland
FCC Releases Study on Telephone Trends, May 22, 2002 — PDF page 1, Advanced Telecommunications Services, first bullet
Mishkin (2008), How Should We Respond to Asset Price Bubbles? — Distinction between credit-driven and other bubbles; technology-stock episode
New research asks a different question: will any of the next 12 monthly observations be at least 20% below today’s price? A new price threshold is set at each forecast origin. Already-declining markets remain in the sample. This is neither a monthly crash-entry probability nor the chance a fundamental bubble exists.
Yₜ = 1 if min(Pₜ₊₁,…,Pₜ₊₁₂) ≤ 0.8 Pₜ All 12 consecutive future observations must exist before scoring. Selected p = logistic(−1.420492589 − 0.348248061 z_drawdown + 0.303113978 z_vol12) z_drawdown = (drawdown + 0.099607477) / 0.135085233 z_vol12 = (vol12 − 0.067705374) / 0.044804680
Training, development and retrospective test periods retain the original chronology. Each complete future outcome window must fit wholly inside its assigned period. Training outcomes end by 1984; development outcomes are within 1987–1997; test outcomes are within 2000–2024. Standardization and coefficients use training only; development selects the ridge penalty and candidate. The simpler two-feature model wins development Brier error. We had already examined the later period in previous research: this is explicitly a retrospective comparison, not a fresh untouched holdout.
| Model | Industry Brier | Nasdaq Brier | Current Nasdaq estimate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constant training rate | 0.14945 | 0.14829 | 20.7% |
| Drawdown + volatility (development-selected) | 0.14598 | 0.12346 | 15.5% |
| Full four-feature model | 0.14618 | 0.12405 | 15.2% |
Industry Brier improvement for the selected model: 0.00347, with a 95% interval of -0.00571 to 0.01193. The Nasdaq interval also spans zero. Both use 2,000 resamples of circular 24-month calendar blocks, preserving all industries together. The model’s apparent advantage is not established with confidence.
At a 10% cutoff the selected model flags every test month—an unusable alarm rule here. The predeclared 20% cutoff gives the counts below. Positive rows are overlapping forecast windows, not distinct crashes; adjacent forecasts can refer to the same decline.
| Sample | Forecast windows | Positive windows | Caught | False alarms | Missed | True negatives |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US industries | 14161 | 2576 | 1092 | 3039 | 1484 | 8546 |
| Nasdaq transfer | 289 | 52 | 31 | 38 | 21 | 199 |
Current research snapshot: 15.5% for September 2026–August 2027, using the August 2026 Nasdaq close. The loss threshold is 21,096.712. The constant comparator is 20.7%. These are uncalibrated transfers from US industry total returns to a broad technology price index, not AI-specific odds. This research snapshot does not update with the separate monthly live feed.
Literature motivates specifying both horizon and loss size. Martin (2017) studies market crash probabilities, but this next-12-month minimum-price target is an original adaptation, not a replication or a literature-standard bubble score.
| Forecast bin | Windows | Mean estimate | Observed frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0%–30.0% | 14161 | 20.7% | 18.2% |
| Forecast bin | Windows | Mean estimate | Observed frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10.0%–20.0% | 10030 | 15.2% | 14.8% |
| 20.0%–30.0% | 2822 | 23.8% | 24.5% |
| 30.0%–40.0% | 764 | 34.2% | 28.7% |
| 40.0%–60.0% | 439 | 47.1% | 33.0% |
| 60.0%–80.0% | 101 | 67.2% | 36.6% |
| 80.0%–100.0% | 5 | 81.3% | 0.0% |
| Forecast bin | Windows | Mean estimate | Observed frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10.0%–20.0% | 9982 | 15.2% | 15.0% |
| 20.0%–30.0% | 2805 | 23.8% | 23.4% |
| 30.0%–40.0% | 788 | 34.1% | 28.2% |
| 40.0%–60.0% | 468 | 47.2% | 33.8% |
| 60.0%–80.0% | 109 | 67.6% | 38.5% |
| 80.0%–100.0% | 9 | 82.0% | 11.1% |
Published monthly chain price index; within-month observation convention unspecified, target-frequency mismatch. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Future-trained illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1870-04 | 1870-05–1871-04 | 13.74% | 20.70% | 13.95% | 0.30% |
| 1870-05 | 1870-06–1871-05 | 12.59% | 20.70% | 12.77% | 4.08% |
| 1870-06 | 1870-07–1871-06 | 12.44% | 20.70% | 12.86% | 4.81% |
| 1870-07 | 1870-08–1871-07 | 13.45% | 20.70% | 14.12% | 1.81% |
| 1870-08 | 1870-09–1871-08 | 13.98% | 20.70% | 14.58% | 0.00% |
| 1870-09 | 1870-10–1871-09 | 13.10% | 20.70% | 13.32% | 0.70% |
| 1870-10 | 1870-11–1871-10 | 12.96% | 20.70% | 13.20% | 1.12% |
| 1870-11 | 1870-12–1871-11 | 12.94% | 20.70% | 13.19% | 1.12% |
| 1870-12 | 1871-01–1871-12 | 13.22% | 20.70% | 13.50% | 0.00% |
| 1871-01 | 1871-02–1872-01 | 13.14% | 20.70% | 13.36% | 0.00% |
| 1871-02 | 1871-03–1872-02 | 12.71% | 20.70% | 12.94% | 0.00% |
| 1871-03 | 1871-04–1872-03 | 12.17% | 20.70% | 12.35% | 1.76% |
| 1871-04 | 1871-05–1872-04 | 11.86% | 20.70% | 12.03% | 4.28% |
| 1871-05 | 1871-06–1872-05 | 11.71% | 20.70% | 11.93% | 6.40% |
| 1871-06 | 1871-07–1872-06 | 11.92% | 20.70% | 12.34% | 5.72% |
| 1871-07 | 1871-08–1872-07 | 12.27% | 20.70% | 12.69% | 3.96% |
| 1871-08 | 1871-09–1872-08 | 11.98% | 20.70% | 12.19% | 4.58% |
| 1871-09 | 1871-10–1872-09 | 11.86% | 20.70% | 12.10% | 5.03% |
| 1871-10 | 1871-11–1872-10 | 13.87% | 20.70% | 14.51% | 0.00% |
| 1871-11 | 1871-12–1872-11 | 13.64% | 20.70% | 13.84% | 0.00% |
| 1871-12 | 1872-01–1872-12 | 13.10% | 20.70% | 13.22% | 0.00% |
| 1872-01 | 1872-02–1873-01 | 12.54% | 20.70% | 12.68% | 0.00% |
| 1872-02 | 1872-03–1873-02 | 12.36% | 20.70% | 12.64% | 0.00% |
| 1872-03 | 1872-04–1873-03 | 12.13% | 20.70% | 12.26% | 2.71% |
| 1872-04 | 1872-05–1873-04 | 12.16% | 20.70% | 12.28% | 5.58% |
| 1872-05 | 1872-06–1873-05 | 12.23% | 20.70% | 12.62% | 5.22% |
| 1872-06 | 1872-07–1873-06 | 12.53% | 20.70% | 12.95% | 4.22% |
| 1872-07 | 1872-08–1873-07 | 12.71% | 20.70% | 13.06% | 3.42% |
| 1872-08 | 1872-09–1873-08 | 13.15% | 20.70% | 13.55% | 2.04% |
| 1872-09 | 1872-10–1873-09 | 13.54% | 20.70% | 13.93% | 7.65% |
| 1872-10 | 1872-11–1873-10 | 13.06% | 20.70% | 13.23% | 15.20% |
| 1872-11 | 1872-12–1873-11 | 13.26% | 20.70% | 13.47% | 17.74% |
| 1872-12 | 1873-01–1873-12 | 12.58% | 20.70% | 12.64% | 19.88% |
| 1873-01 | 1873-02–1874-01 | 12.26% | 20.70% | 12.49% | 20.66% |
| 1873-02 | 1873-03–1874-02 | 11.94% | 20.70% | 12.19% | 21.61% |
| 1873-03 | 1873-04–1874-03 | 12.03% | 20.70% | 12.46% | 20.96% |
| 1873-04 | 1873-05–1874-04 | 12.23% | 20.70% | 12.78% | 19.58% |
| 1873-05 | 1873-06–1874-05 | 12.05% | 20.70% | 12.48% | 19.71% |
| 1873-06 | 1873-07–1874-06 | 12.27% | 20.70% | 12.74% | 19.03% |
| 1873-07 | 1873-08–1874-07 | 12.36% | 20.70% | 12.76% | 18.75% |
| 1873-08 | 1873-09–1874-08 | 12.46% | 20.70% | 12.84% | 18.31% |
| 1873-09 | 1873-10–1874-09 | 15.80% | 20.70% | 16.76% | 11.65% |
| 1873-10 | 1873-11–1874-10 | 19.44% | 20.70% | 20.54% | 3.60% |
| 1873-11 | 1873-12–1874-11 | 20.71% | 20.70% | 21.26% | 0.00% |
| 1873-12 | 1874-01–1874-12 | 18.85% | 20.70% | 18.41% | 0.13% |
| 1874-01 | 1874-02–1875-01 | 17.42% | 20.70% | 17.42% | 5.28% |
| 1874-02 | 1874-03–1875-02 | 16.32% | 20.70% | 16.65% | 7.81% |
| 1874-03 | 1874-04–1875-03 | 16.41% | 20.70% | 17.15% | 6.14% |
| 1874-04 | 1874-05–1875-04 | 17.35% | 20.70% | 18.12% | 3.51% |
Monthly mean/published index, not verified month-end closes; target-frequency mismatch. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Future-trained illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1927-09 | 1927-10–1928-09 | 12.04% | 20.70% | 11.65% | 1.53% |
| 1927-10 | 1927-11–1928-10 | 12.37% | 20.70% | 12.37% | 0.00% |
| 1927-11 | 1927-12–1928-11 | 11.94% | 20.70% | 11.72% | 0.00% |
| 1927-12 | 1928-01–1928-12 | 11.94% | 20.70% | 11.72% | 0.80% |
| 1928-01 | 1928-02–1929-01 | 11.86% | 20.70% | 11.74% | 1.20% |
| 1928-02 | 1928-03–1929-02 | 12.36% | 20.70% | 12.37% | 0.00% |
| 1928-03 | 1928-04–1929-03 | 12.16% | 20.70% | 11.73% | 0.00% |
| 1928-04 | 1928-05–1929-04 | 12.34% | 20.70% | 11.77% | 1.96% |
| 1928-05 | 1928-06–1929-05 | 12.34% | 20.70% | 11.97% | 4.90% |
| 1928-06 | 1928-07–1929-06 | 14.43% | 20.70% | 14.59% | 0.00% |
| 1928-07 | 1928-08–1929-07 | 14.22% | 20.70% | 14.01% | 0.00% |
| 1928-08 | 1928-09–1929-08 | 13.18% | 20.70% | 12.97% | 0.00% |
| 1928-09 | 1928-10–1929-09 | 12.97% | 20.70% | 12.53% | 0.00% |
| 1928-10 | 1928-11–1929-10 | 12.84% | 20.70% | 12.65% | 0.00% |
| 1928-11 | 1928-12–1929-11 | 13.02% | 20.70% | 12.43% | 10.75% |
| 1928-12 | 1929-01–1929-12 | 13.06% | 20.70% | 12.94% | 11.10% |
| 1929-01 | 1929-02–1930-01 | 13.21% | 20.70% | 12.48% | 17.22% |
| 1929-02 | 1929-03–1930-02 | 13.10% | 20.70% | 12.78% | 17.65% |
| 1929-03 | 1929-04–1930-03 | 13.06% | 20.70% | 12.73% | 19.07% |
| 1929-04 | 1929-05–1930-04 | 13.20% | 20.70% | 13.15% | 18.59% |
| 1929-05 | 1929-06–1930-05 | 13.02% | 20.70% | 12.89% | 19.80% |
| 1929-06 | 1929-07–1930-06 | 12.42% | 20.70% | 12.11% | 21.30% |
| 1929-07 | 1929-08–1930-07 | 12.72% | 20.70% | 11.81% | 27.74% |
| 1929-08 | 1929-09–1930-08 | 12.77% | 20.70% | 12.00% | 31.63% |
| 1929-09 | 1929-10–1930-09 | 12.64% | 20.70% | 12.05% | 34.25% |
| 1929-10 | 1929-11–1930-10 | 18.02% | 20.70% | 18.49% | 35.98% |
| 1929-11 | 1929-12–1930-11 | 36.95% | 20.70% | 40.59% | 19.24% |
| 1929-12 | 1930-01–1930-12 | 35.53% | 20.70% | 34.19% | 27.52% |
| 1930-01 | 1930-02–1931-01 | 34.56% | 20.70% | 33.89% | 28.56% |
| 1930-02 | 1930-03–1931-02 | 32.37% | 20.70% | 31.20% | 32.77% |
| 1930-03 | 1930-04–1931-03 | 30.90% | 20.70% | 30.19% | 35.21% |
| 1930-04 | 1930-05–1931-04 | 28.52% | 20.70% | 27.62% | 39.08% |
| 1930-05 | 1930-06–1931-05 | 31.34% | 20.70% | 31.99% | 40.14% |
| 1930-06 | 1930-07–1931-06 | 36.30% | 20.70% | 37.61% | 35.55% |
| 1930-07 | 1930-08–1931-07 | 36.45% | 20.70% | 36.89% | 34.14% |
| 1930-08 | 1930-09–1931-08 | 36.52% | 20.70% | 37.07% | 33.29% |
| 1930-09 | 1930-10–1931-09 | 31.73% | 20.70% | 32.82% | 43.07% |
| 1930-10 | 1930-11–1931-10 | 34.37% | 20.70% | 37.49% | 42.80% |
| 1930-11 | 1930-12–1931-11 | 31.36% | 20.70% | 31.81% | 38.33% |
| 1930-12 | 1931-01–1931-12 | 33.67% | 20.70% | 34.18% | 45.58% |
| 1931-01 | 1931-02–1932-01 | 32.76% | 20.70% | 32.00% | 48.06% |
| 1931-02 | 1931-03–1932-02 | 30.33% | 20.70% | 29.33% | 52.15% |
| 1931-03 | 1931-04–1932-03 | 29.44% | 20.70% | 29.32% | 53.05% |
| 1931-04 | 1931-05–1932-04 | 30.43% | 20.70% | 32.37% | 60.40% |
| 1931-05 | 1931-06–1932-05 | 30.56% | 20.70% | 32.73% | 61.55% |
| 1931-06 | 1931-07–1932-06 | 30.52% | 20.70% | 31.38% | 65.61% |
| 1931-07 | 1931-08–1932-07 | 29.29% | 20.70% | 29.29% | 66.71% |
| 1931-08 | 1931-09–1932-08 | 30.35% | 20.70% | 31.11% | 65.68% |
| 1931-09 | 1931-10–1932-09 | 32.05% | 20.70% | 35.32% | 59.68% |
Monthly mean/published index, not verified month-end closes; target-frequency mismatch. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Future-trained illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1978-01 | 1978-02–1979-01 | 13.21% | 20.70% | 12.62% | 0.00% |
| 1978-02 | 1978-03–1979-02 | 13.21% | 20.70% | 12.95% | 1.61% |
| 1978-03 | 1978-04–1979-03 | 12.81% | 20.70% | 12.65% | 4.54% |
| 1978-04 | 1978-05–1979-04 | 14.59% | 20.70% | 14.94% | 0.00% |
| 1978-05 | 1978-06–1979-05 | 14.31% | 20.70% | 14.23% | 0.00% |
| 1978-06 | 1978-07–1979-06 | 12.79% | 20.70% | 12.44% | 0.00% |
| 1978-07 | 1978-08–1979-07 | 12.79% | 20.70% | 12.52% | 0.00% |
| 1978-08 | 1978-09–1979-08 | 13.17% | 20.70% | 12.31% | 0.05% |
| 1978-09 | 1978-10–1979-09 | 13.17% | 20.70% | 12.73% | 2.77% |
| 1978-10 | 1978-11–1979-10 | 13.23% | 20.70% | 12.48% | 9.34% |
| 1978-11 | 1978-12–1979-11 | 17.69% | 20.70% | 18.14% | 0.00% |
| 1978-12 | 1979-01–1979-12 | 17.35% | 20.70% | 16.84% | 0.00% |
| 1979-01 | 1979-02–1980-01 | 14.53% | 20.70% | 13.81% | 0.00% |
| 1979-02 | 1979-03–1980-02 | 14.70% | 20.70% | 13.95% | 2.67% |
| 1979-03 | 1979-04–1980-03 | 15.30% | 20.70% | 15.30% | 1.21% |
| 1979-04 | 1979-05–1980-04 | 15.43% | 20.70% | 15.27% | 0.00% |
| 1979-05 | 1979-06–1980-05 | 14.66% | 20.70% | 13.81% | 0.00% |
| 1979-06 | 1979-07–1980-06 | 14.81% | 20.70% | 13.82% | 0.00% |
| 1979-07 | 1979-08–1980-07 | 14.83% | 20.70% | 13.96% | 0.00% |
| 1979-08 | 1979-09–1980-08 | 14.64% | 20.70% | 14.18% | 0.00% |
| 1979-09 | 1979-10–1980-09 | 15.70% | 20.70% | 13.80% | 0.00% |
| 1979-10 | 1979-11–1980-10 | 15.83% | 20.70% | 14.36% | 0.00% |
| 1979-11 | 1979-12–1980-11 | 14.58% | 20.70% | 13.66% | 0.00% |
| 1979-12 | 1980-01–1980-12 | 14.96% | 20.70% | 12.64% | 0.00% |
| 1980-01 | 1980-02–1981-01 | 20.14% | 20.70% | 14.49% | 23.92% |
| 1980-02 | 1980-03–1981-02 | 21.22% | 20.70% | 19.12% | 24.88% |
| 1980-03 | 1980-04–1981-03 | 32.28% | 20.70% | 31.27% | 9.84% |
| 1980-04 | 1980-05–1981-04 | 35.96% | 20.70% | 33.13% | 4.18% |
| 1980-05 | 1980-06–1981-05 | 36.50% | 20.70% | 33.13% | 6.64% |
| 1980-06 | 1980-07–1981-06 | 29.59% | 20.70% | 25.23% | 23.24% |
| 1980-07 | 1980-08–1981-07 | 26.32% | 20.70% | 23.58% | 36.41% |
| 1980-08 | 1980-09–1981-08 | 27.78% | 20.70% | 26.07% | 34.77% |
| 1980-09 | 1980-10–1981-09 | 23.92% | 20.70% | 22.05% | 39.27% |
| 1980-10 | 1980-11–1981-10 | 24.88% | 20.70% | 24.27% | 38.13% |
| 1980-11 | 1980-12–1981-11 | 27.90% | 20.70% | 27.57% | 34.52% |
| 1980-12 | 1981-01–1981-12 | 35.74% | 20.70% | 37.03% | 24.00% |
| 1981-01 | 1981-02–1982-01 | 25.85% | 20.70% | 26.10% | 31.08% |
| 1981-02 | 1981-03–1982-02 | 30.84% | 20.70% | 32.83% | 25.14% |
| 1981-03 | 1981-04–1982-03 | 28.91% | 20.70% | 28.64% | 33.83% |
| 1981-04 | 1981-05–1982-04 | 28.88% | 20.70% | 28.40% | 33.39% |
| 1981-05 | 1981-06–1982-05 | 30.23% | 20.70% | 30.01% | 31.15% |
| 1981-06 | 1981-07–1982-06 | 29.25% | 20.70% | 29.65% | 31.69% |
| 1981-07 | 1981-08–1982-07 | 33.36% | 20.70% | 35.14% | 23.00% |
| 1981-08 | 1981-09–1982-08 | 33.42% | 20.70% | 33.38% | 23.21% |
| 1981-09 | 1981-10–1982-09 | 30.10% | 20.70% | 29.50% | 29.02% |
| 1981-10 | 1981-11–1982-10 | 28.54% | 20.70% | 29.32% | 28.05% |
| 1981-11 | 1981-12–1982-11 | 26.44% | 20.70% | 28.01% | 23.80% |
| 1981-12 | 1982-01–1982-12 | 25.36% | 20.70% | 25.69% | 23.19% |
| 1982-01 | 1982-02–1983-01 | 23.55% | 20.70% | 25.09% | 18.00% |
Month-end daily close. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Development-era illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1987-12 | 1988-01–1988-12 | 21.69% | 20.70% | 21.64% | 0.00% |
| 1988-01 | 1988-02–1989-01 | 18.70% | 20.70% | 17.67% | 0.00% |
| 1988-02 | 1988-03–1989-02 | 16.55% | 20.70% | 15.99% | 0.00% |
| 1988-03 | 1988-04–1989-03 | 15.45% | 20.70% | 15.30% | 0.00% |
| 1988-04 | 1988-05–1989-04 | 15.26% | 20.70% | 15.16% | 0.25% |
| 1988-05 | 1988-06–1989-05 | 15.12% | 20.70% | 15.53% | 0.19% |
| 1988-06 | 1988-07–1989-06 | 15.03% | 20.70% | 15.23% | 1.45% |
| 1988-07 | 1988-08–1989-07 | 15.03% | 20.70% | 15.31% | 1.96% |
| 1988-08 | 1988-09–1989-08 | 15.54% | 20.70% | 16.15% | 0.00% |
| 1988-09 | 1988-10–1989-09 | 14.90% | 20.70% | 15.21% | 0.00% |
| 1988-10 | 1988-11–1989-10 | 13.29% | 20.70% | 13.35% | 0.00% |
| 1988-11 | 1988-12–1989-11 | 13.36% | 20.70% | 12.91% | 0.00% |
| 1988-12 | 1989-01–1989-12 | 12.80% | 20.70% | 12.45% | 0.00% |
| 1989-01 | 1989-02–1990-01 | 12.35% | 20.70% | 11.92% | 0.00% |
| 1989-02 | 1989-03–1990-02 | 12.09% | 20.70% | 11.99% | 0.00% |
| 1989-03 | 1989-04–1990-03 | 12.04% | 20.70% | 11.87% | 8.70% |
| 1989-04 | 1989-05–1990-04 | 11.95% | 20.70% | 11.82% | 12.25% |
| 1989-05 | 1989-06–1990-05 | 11.89% | 20.70% | 11.79% | 13.66% |
| 1989-06 | 1989-07–1990-06 | 13.45% | 20.70% | 13.72% | 10.21% |
| 1989-07 | 1989-08–1990-07 | 12.55% | 20.70% | 12.16% | 15.36% |
| 1989-08 | 1989-09–1990-08 | 12.93% | 20.70% | 12.98% | 24.55% |
| 1989-09 | 1989-10–1990-09 | 12.53% | 20.70% | 12.27% | 41.12% |
| 1989-10 | 1989-11–1990-10 | 12.62% | 20.70% | 12.61% | 40.97% |
| 1989-11 | 1989-12–1990-11 | 12.49% | 20.70% | 12.17% | 43.70% |
| 1989-12 | 1990-01–1990-12 | 12.55% | 20.70% | 12.21% | 46.08% |
| 1990-01 | 1990-02–1991-01 | 14.24% | 20.70% | 14.57% | 43.58% |
| 1990-02 | 1990-03–1991-02 | 17.25% | 20.70% | 17.81% | 39.34% |
| 1990-03 | 1990-04–1991-03 | 24.18% | 20.70% | 25.64% | 30.01% |
| 1990-04 | 1990-05–1991-04 | 24.54% | 20.70% | 24.58% | 29.07% |
| 1990-05 | 1990-06–1991-05 | 21.58% | 20.70% | 20.54% | 36.66% |
| 1990-06 | 1990-07–1991-06 | 22.93% | 20.70% | 23.27% | 34.30% |
| 1990-07 | 1990-08–1991-07 | 23.69% | 20.70% | 24.11% | 32.39% |
| 1990-08 | 1990-09–1991-08 | 32.60% | 20.70% | 34.96% | 19.23% |
| 1990-09 | 1990-10–1991-09 | 42.57% | 20.70% | 45.88% | 0.00% |
| 1990-10 | 1990-11–1991-10 | 39.12% | 20.70% | 36.61% | 11.34% |
| 1990-11 | 1990-12–1991-11 | 43.49% | 20.70% | 45.59% | 0.53% |
| 1990-12 | 1991-01–1991-12 | 39.67% | 20.70% | 39.56% | 6.34% |
| 1991-01 | 1991-02–1992-01 | 37.72% | 20.70% | 39.00% | 5.45% |
| 1991-02 | 1991-03–1992-02 | 31.80% | 20.70% | 31.09% | 19.20% |
| 1991-03 | 1991-04–1992-03 | 31.14% | 20.70% | 31.54% | 26.42% |
| 1991-04 | 1991-05–1992-04 | 31.45% | 20.70% | 31.81% | 33.40% |
| 1991-05 | 1991-06–1992-05 | 29.47% | 20.70% | 30.52% | 32.57% |
| 1991-06 | 1991-07–1992-06 | 32.96% | 20.70% | 35.19% | 31.51% |
| 1991-07 | 1991-08–1992-07 | 24.59% | 20.70% | 25.68% | 34.04% |
| 1991-08 | 1991-09–1992-08 | 26.74% | 20.70% | 28.40% | 28.77% |
| 1991-09 | 1991-10–1992-09 | 21.62% | 20.70% | 20.87% | 33.48% |
| 1991-10 | 1991-11–1992-10 | 17.85% | 20.70% | 17.92% | 36.92% |
| 1991-11 | 1991-12–1992-11 | 21.63% | 20.70% | 22.80% | 29.87% |
| 1991-12 | 1992-01–1992-12 | 20.88% | 20.70% | 21.00% | 30.78% |
Month-end daily close. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Post-development asset-transfer illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998-03 | 1998-04–1999-03 | 14.14% | 20.70% | 13.51% | 18.33% |
| 1998-04 | 1998-05–1999-04 | 14.16% | 20.70% | 13.69% | 19.76% |
| 1998-05 | 1998-06–1999-05 | 15.69% | 20.70% | 15.90% | 15.72% |
| 1998-06 | 1998-07–1999-06 | 14.25% | 20.70% | 13.73% | 20.87% |
| 1998-07 | 1998-08–1999-07 | 14.16% | 20.70% | 14.41% | 19.93% |
| 1998-08 | 1998-09–1999-08 | 26.02% | 20.70% | 28.63% | 0.00% |
| 1998-09 | 1998-10–1999-09 | 21.97% | 20.70% | 21.00% | 0.00% |
| 1998-10 | 1998-11–1999-10 | 20.09% | 20.70% | 19.84% | 0.00% |
| 1998-11 | 1998-12–1999-11 | 17.88% | 20.70% | 17.27% | 0.00% |
| 1998-12 | 1999-01–1999-12 | 18.25% | 20.70% | 17.06% | 0.00% |
| 1999-01 | 1999-02–2000-01 | 18.74% | 20.70% | 17.11% | 8.69% |
| 1999-02 | 1999-03–2000-02 | 22.96% | 20.70% | 23.58% | 0.00% |
| 1999-03 | 1999-04–2000-03 | 20.07% | 20.70% | 19.28% | 0.00% |
| 1999-04 | 1999-05–2000-04 | 19.35% | 20.70% | 19.00% | 2.84% |
| 1999-05 | 1999-06–2000-05 | 20.39% | 20.70% | 20.42% | 0.00% |
| 1999-06 | 1999-07–2000-06 | 19.31% | 20.70% | 18.37% | 1.77% |
| 1999-07 | 1999-08–2000-07 | 20.06% | 20.70% | 20.00% | 0.00% |
| 1999-08 | 1999-09–2000-08 | 15.82% | 20.70% | 14.67% | 0.00% |
| 1999-09 | 1999-10–2000-09 | 15.57% | 20.70% | 15.00% | 0.00% |
| 1999-10 | 1999-11–2000-10 | 15.65% | 20.70% | 14.41% | 0.00% |
| 1999-11 | 1999-12–2000-11 | 15.81% | 20.70% | 14.21% | 22.13% |
| 1999-12 | 2000-01–2000-12 | 16.83% | 20.70% | 14.33% | 39.29% |
| 2000-01 | 2000-02–2001-01 | 17.89% | 20.70% | 17.51% | 37.30% |
| 2000-02 | 2000-03–2001-02 | 16.53% | 20.70% | 14.00% | 54.18% |
| 2000-03 | 2000-04–2001-03 | 17.86% | 20.70% | 17.00% | 59.76% |
| 2000-04 | 2000-05–2001-04 | 27.23% | 20.70% | 27.62% | 52.33% |
| 2000-05 | 2000-06–2001-05 | 33.86% | 20.70% | 33.42% | 45.89% |
| 2000-06 | 2000-07–2001-06 | 27.96% | 20.70% | 24.77% | 53.60% |
| 2000-07 | 2000-08–2001-07 | 30.46% | 20.70% | 29.51% | 51.15% |
| 2000-08 | 2000-09–2001-08 | 25.90% | 20.70% | 23.54% | 57.08% |
| 2000-09 | 2000-10–2001-09 | 33.34% | 20.70% | 33.67% | 59.19% |
| 2000-10 | 2000-11–2001-10 | 37.53% | 20.70% | 37.39% | 55.52% |
| 2000-11 | 2000-12–2001-11 | 50.58% | 20.70% | 53.62% | 42.31% |
| 2000-12 | 2001-01–2001-12 | 49.45% | 20.70% | 50.17% | 39.33% |
| 2001-01 | 2001-02–2002-01 | 46.60% | 20.70% | 44.63% | 45.94% |
| 2001-02 | 2001-03–2002-02 | 53.92% | 20.70% | 58.62% | 30.35% |
| 2001-03 | 2001-04–2002-03 | 56.33% | 20.70% | 59.87% | 18.55% |
| 2001-04 | 2001-05–2002-04 | 53.72% | 20.70% | 51.87% | 29.18% |
| 2001-05 | 2001-06–2002-05 | 53.55% | 20.70% | 53.28% | 28.98% |
| 2001-06 | 2001-07–2002-06 | 50.89% | 20.70% | 50.91% | 32.28% |
| 2001-07 | 2001-08–2002-07 | 52.94% | 20.70% | 54.09% | 34.48% |
| 2001-08 | 2001-09–2002-08 | 50.78% | 20.70% | 53.88% | 27.17% |
| 2001-09 | 2001-10–2002-09 | 54.32% | 20.70% | 58.31% | 21.80% |
| 2001-10 | 2001-11–2002-10 | 45.67% | 20.70% | 45.44% | 30.66% |
| 2001-11 | 2001-12–2002-11 | 39.26% | 20.70% | 37.71% | 39.29% |
| 2001-12 | 2002-01–2002-12 | 38.83% | 20.70% | 38.87% | 39.91% |
| 2002-01 | 2002-02–2003-01 | 27.02% | 20.70% | 29.08% | 39.40% |
| 2002-02 | 2002-03–2003-02 | 29.57% | 20.70% | 31.75% | 32.31% |
| 2002-03 | 2002-04–2003-03 | 25.92% | 20.70% | 25.31% | 36.49% |
Monthly mean/published index, not verified month-end closes; target-frequency mismatch. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Post-development asset-transfer illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2004-07 | 2004-08–2005-07 | 10.80% | 20.70% | 10.89% | 0.00% |
| 2004-08 | 2004-09–2005-08 | 10.80% | 20.70% | 10.91% | 0.00% |
| 2004-09 | 2004-10–2005-09 | 10.80% | 20.70% | 10.91% | 0.00% |
| 2004-10 | 2004-11–2005-10 | 10.79% | 20.70% | 10.91% | 0.00% |
| 2004-11 | 2004-12–2005-11 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.89% | 0.00% |
| 2004-12 | 2005-01–2005-12 | 10.77% | 20.70% | 10.88% | 0.00% |
| 2005-01 | 2005-02–2006-01 | 10.77% | 20.70% | 10.86% | 0.00% |
| 2005-02 | 2005-03–2006-02 | 10.76% | 20.70% | 10.85% | 0.00% |
| 2005-03 | 2005-04–2006-03 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.83% | 0.00% |
| 2005-04 | 2005-05–2006-04 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.84% | 0.00% |
| 2005-05 | 2005-06–2006-05 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.84% | 0.00% |
| 2005-06 | 2005-07–2006-06 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.84% | 0.00% |
| 2005-07 | 2005-08–2006-07 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.86% | 0.00% |
| 2005-08 | 2005-09–2006-08 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.86% | 0.00% |
| 2005-09 | 2005-10–2006-09 | 10.78% | 20.70% | 10.86% | 0.00% |
| 2005-10 | 2005-11–2006-10 | 10.79% | 20.70% | 10.89% | 0.00% |
| 2005-11 | 2005-12–2006-11 | 10.81% | 20.70% | 10.92% | 0.00% |
| 2005-12 | 2006-01–2006-12 | 10.85% | 20.70% | 11.00% | 0.00% |
| 2006-01 | 2006-02–2007-01 | 10.88% | 20.70% | 11.02% | 0.00% |
| 2006-02 | 2006-03–2007-02 | 10.90% | 20.70% | 11.06% | 0.00% |
| 2006-03 | 2006-04–2007-03 | 10.87% | 20.70% | 11.03% | 0.31% |
| 2006-04 | 2006-05–2007-04 | 10.85% | 20.70% | 11.04% | 0.83% |
| 2006-05 | 2006-06–2007-05 | 10.82% | 20.70% | 11.03% | 1.35% |
| 2006-06 | 2006-07–2007-06 | 10.79% | 20.70% | 11.05% | 1.63% |
| 2006-07 | 2006-08–2007-07 | 10.77% | 20.70% | 11.06% | 1.96% |
| 2006-08 | 2006-09–2007-08 | 10.79% | 20.70% | 11.11% | 2.26% |
| 2006-09 | 2006-10–2007-09 | 10.80% | 20.70% | 11.13% | 2.76% |
| 2006-10 | 2006-11–2007-10 | 10.82% | 20.70% | 11.16% | 3.54% |
| 2006-11 | 2006-12–2007-11 | 10.89% | 20.70% | 11.25% | 4.61% |
| 2006-12 | 2007-01–2007-12 | 10.96% | 20.70% | 11.32% | 5.40% |
| 2007-01 | 2007-02–2008-01 | 11.04% | 20.70% | 11.41% | 6.37% |
| 2007-02 | 2007-03–2008-02 | 11.06% | 20.70% | 11.43% | 7.28% |
| 2007-03 | 2007-04–2008-03 | 11.06% | 20.70% | 11.44% | 7.84% |
| 2007-04 | 2007-05–2008-04 | 11.02% | 20.70% | 11.40% | 8.13% |
| 2007-05 | 2007-06–2008-05 | 11.01% | 20.70% | 11.40% | 8.18% |
| 2007-06 | 2007-07–2008-06 | 11.04% | 20.70% | 11.43% | 8.27% |
| 2007-07 | 2007-08–2008-07 | 11.08% | 20.70% | 11.49% | 8.44% |
| 2007-08 | 2007-09–2008-08 | 11.18% | 20.70% | 11.59% | 8.85% |
| 2007-09 | 2007-10–2008-09 | 11.35% | 20.70% | 11.77% | 9.61% |
| 2007-10 | 2007-11–2008-10 | 11.57% | 20.70% | 12.01% | 10.35% |
| 2007-11 | 2007-12–2008-11 | 11.96% | 20.70% | 12.43% | 10.90% |
| 2007-12 | 2008-01–2008-12 | 12.19% | 20.70% | 12.64% | 12.00% |
| 2008-01 | 2008-02–2009-01 | 12.55% | 20.70% | 13.00% | 12.69% |
| 2008-02 | 2008-03–2009-02 | 12.80% | 20.70% | 13.24% | 12.75% |
| 2008-03 | 2008-04–2009-03 | 12.98% | 20.70% | 13.39% | 12.74% |
| 2008-04 | 2008-05–2009-04 | 13.02% | 20.70% | 13.39% | 12.43% |
| 2008-05 | 2008-06–2009-05 | 13.01% | 20.70% | 13.37% | 12.28% |
| 2008-06 | 2008-07–2009-06 | 13.00% | 20.70% | 13.37% | 12.02% |
| 2008-07 | 2008-08–2009-07 | 13.01% | 20.70% | 13.40% | 11.59% |
Monthly mean/published index, not verified month-end closes; target-frequency mismatch. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Post-development asset-transfer illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-10 | 2005-11–2006-10 | 19.56% | 20.70% | 20.45% | 3.00% |
| 2005-11 | 2005-12–2006-11 | 19.57% | 20.70% | 20.42% | 0.00% |
| 2005-12 | 2006-01–2006-12 | 18.17% | 20.70% | 18.53% | 0.00% |
| 2006-01 | 2006-02–2007-01 | 15.85% | 20.70% | 15.67% | 0.00% |
| 2006-02 | 2006-03–2007-02 | 14.66% | 20.70% | 14.93% | 0.00% |
| 2006-03 | 2006-04–2007-03 | 14.63% | 20.70% | 15.20% | 0.00% |
| 2006-04 | 2006-05–2007-04 | 14.75% | 20.70% | 14.50% | 0.00% |
| 2006-05 | 2006-06–2007-05 | 14.91% | 20.70% | 13.69% | 0.00% |
| 2006-06 | 2006-07–2007-06 | 14.74% | 20.70% | 14.21% | 0.19% |
| 2006-07 | 2006-08–2007-07 | 14.33% | 20.70% | 13.44% | 4.75% |
| 2006-08 | 2006-09–2007-08 | 16.09% | 20.70% | 16.07% | 0.00% |
| 2006-09 | 2006-10–2007-09 | 14.56% | 20.70% | 13.87% | 0.00% |
| 2006-10 | 2006-11–2007-10 | 14.16% | 20.70% | 13.35% | 0.00% |
| 2006-11 | 2006-12–2007-11 | 13.94% | 20.70% | 12.55% | 0.00% |
| 2006-12 | 2007-01–2007-12 | 14.77% | 20.70% | 12.51% | 0.00% |
| 2007-01 | 2007-02–2008-01 | 15.81% | 20.70% | 12.99% | 0.00% |
| 2007-02 | 2007-03–2008-02 | 15.91% | 20.70% | 14.40% | 0.00% |
| 2007-03 | 2007-04–2008-03 | 15.67% | 20.70% | 13.88% | 0.00% |
| 2007-04 | 2007-05–2008-04 | 16.18% | 20.70% | 13.23% | 3.89% |
| 2007-05 | 2007-06–2008-05 | 16.17% | 20.70% | 13.49% | 15.66% |
| 2007-06 | 2007-07–2008-06 | 16.56% | 20.70% | 14.91% | 24.95% |
| 2007-07 | 2007-08–2008-07 | 16.79% | 20.70% | 15.20% | 30.23% |
| 2007-08 | 2007-09–2008-08 | 16.33% | 20.70% | 12.86% | 48.51% |
| 2007-09 | 2007-10–2008-09 | 16.26% | 20.70% | 13.32% | 59.48% |
| 2007-10 | 2007-11–2008-10 | 16.15% | 20.70% | 13.36% | 65.64% |
| 2007-11 | 2007-12–2008-11 | 21.41% | 20.70% | 19.59% | 64.37% |
| 2007-12 | 2008-01–2008-12 | 23.08% | 20.70% | 21.07% | 63.06% |
| 2008-01 | 2008-02–2009-01 | 22.37% | 20.70% | 20.67% | 62.89% |
| 2008-02 | 2008-03–2009-02 | 28.84% | 20.70% | 28.15% | 58.20% |
| 2008-03 | 2008-04–2009-03 | 36.22% | 20.70% | 35.77% | 52.09% |
| 2008-04 | 2008-05–2009-04 | 41.54% | 20.70% | 41.86% | 44.82% |
| 2008-05 | 2008-06–2009-05 | 38.65% | 20.70% | 36.80% | 47.37% |
| 2008-06 | 2008-07–2009-06 | 46.28% | 20.70% | 47.66% | 37.71% |
| 2008-07 | 2008-08–2009-07 | 48.70% | 20.70% | 48.64% | 33.05% |
| 2008-08 | 2008-09–2009-08 | 48.47% | 20.70% | 50.02% | 24.85% |
| 2008-09 | 2008-10–2009-09 | 50.10% | 20.70% | 52.66% | 13.63% |
| 2008-10 | 2008-11–2009-10 | 47.55% | 20.70% | 50.12% | 5.29% |
| 2008-11 | 2008-12–2009-11 | 48.12% | 20.70% | 49.87% | 0.00% |
| 2008-12 | 2009-01–2009-12 | 48.48% | 20.70% | 48.60% | 0.63% |
| 2009-01 | 2009-02–2010-01 | 45.50% | 20.70% | 46.72% | 0.00% |
| 2009-02 | 2009-03–2010-02 | 40.58% | 20.70% | 39.74% | 0.00% |
| 2009-03 | 2009-04–2010-03 | 36.57% | 20.70% | 37.29% | 0.00% |
| 2009-04 | 2009-05–2010-04 | 33.33% | 20.70% | 32.27% | 0.00% |
| 2009-05 | 2009-06–2010-05 | 24.16% | 20.70% | 24.81% | 0.00% |
| 2009-06 | 2009-07–2010-06 | 17.75% | 20.70% | 18.02% | 10.07% |
| 2009-07 | 2009-08–2010-07 | 18.22% | 20.70% | 17.52% | 22.32% |
| 2009-08 | 2009-09–2010-08 | 19.16% | 20.70% | 19.57% | 18.93% |
| 2009-09 | 2009-10–2010-09 | 20.42% | 20.70% | 20.46% | 13.69% |
| 2009-10 | 2009-11–2010-10 | 18.73% | 20.70% | 17.74% | 15.37% |
Monthly mean/published index, not verified month-end closes; target-frequency mismatch. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Post-development asset-transfer illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-06 | 2013-07–2014-06 | 17.36% | 20.70% | 18.24% | 5.59% |
| 2013-07 | 2013-08–2014-07 | 19.35% | 20.70% | 20.04% | 0.00% |
| 2013-08 | 2013-09–2014-08 | 18.43% | 20.70% | 18.25% | 2.14% |
| 2013-09 | 2013-10–2014-09 | 16.88% | 20.70% | 16.54% | 7.16% |
| 2013-10 | 2013-11–2014-10 | 16.90% | 20.70% | 17.06% | 7.08% |
| 2013-11 | 2013-12–2014-11 | 17.17% | 20.70% | 17.32% | 6.13% |
| 2013-12 | 2014-01–2014-12 | 17.03% | 20.70% | 17.19% | 6.19% |
| 2014-01 | 2014-02–2015-01 | 18.51% | 20.70% | 19.38% | 0.50% |
| 2014-02 | 2014-03–2015-02 | 16.37% | 20.70% | 16.78% | 2.42% |
| 2014-03 | 2014-04–2015-03 | 16.44% | 20.70% | 17.13% | 0.35% |
| 2014-04 | 2014-05–2015-04 | 15.84% | 20.70% | 16.10% | 2.13% |
| 2014-05 | 2014-06–2015-05 | 15.39% | 20.70% | 16.14% | 0.00% |
| 2014-06 | 2014-07–2015-06 | 14.90% | 20.70% | 15.25% | 0.00% |
| 2014-07 | 2014-08–2015-07 | 13.92% | 20.70% | 14.04% | 0.00% |
| 2014-08 | 2014-09–2015-08 | 12.86% | 20.70% | 12.80% | 0.00% |
| 2014-09 | 2014-10–2015-09 | 12.78% | 20.70% | 12.86% | 0.00% |
| 2014-10 | 2014-11–2015-10 | 12.79% | 20.70% | 13.02% | 0.00% |
| 2014-11 | 2014-12–2015-11 | 12.98% | 20.70% | 12.80% | 0.00% |
| 2014-12 | 2015-01–2015-12 | 15.06% | 20.70% | 13.51% | 0.00% |
| 2015-01 | 2015-02–2016-01 | 14.73% | 20.70% | 13.50% | 8.47% |
| 2015-02 | 2015-03–2016-02 | 15.87% | 20.70% | 15.53% | 12.74% |
| 2015-03 | 2015-04–2016-03 | 14.87% | 20.70% | 13.56% | 19.81% |
| 2015-04 | 2015-05–2016-04 | 15.84% | 20.70% | 13.40% | 33.03% |
| 2015-05 | 2015-06–2016-05 | 15.42% | 20.70% | 13.61% | 37.45% |
| 2015-06 | 2015-07–2016-06 | 15.17% | 20.70% | 13.25% | 41.60% |
| 2015-07 | 2015-08–2016-07 | 28.23% | 20.70% | 28.35% | 27.40% |
| 2015-08 | 2015-09–2016-08 | 31.89% | 20.70% | 30.20% | 22.27% |
| 2015-09 | 2015-10–2016-09 | 39.38% | 20.70% | 38.63% | 10.77% |
| 2015-10 | 2015-11–2016-10 | 37.54% | 20.70% | 34.31% | 14.74% |
| 2015-11 | 2015-12–2016-11 | 34.14% | 20.70% | 30.89% | 21.55% |
| 2015-12 | 2016-01–2016-12 | 32.83% | 20.70% | 31.52% | 21.22% |
| 2016-01 | 2016-02–2017-01 | 40.76% | 20.70% | 42.02% | 7.18% |
| 2016-02 | 2016-03–2017-02 | 43.85% | 20.70% | 43.62% | 0.00% |
| 2016-03 | 2016-04–2017-03 | 41.91% | 20.70% | 40.36% | 1.55% |
| 2016-04 | 2016-05–2017-04 | 38.14% | 20.70% | 37.53% | 4.72% |
| 2016-05 | 2016-06–2017-05 | 39.24% | 20.70% | 40.10% | 0.00% |
| 2016-06 | 2016-07–2017-06 | 29.60% | 20.70% | 30.90% | 0.00% |
| 2016-07 | 2016-08–2017-07 | 23.26% | 20.70% | 23.66% | 0.00% |
| 2016-08 | 2016-09–2017-08 | 22.36% | 20.70% | 22.88% | 0.54% |
| 2016-09 | 2016-10–2017-09 | 21.33% | 20.70% | 21.50% | 0.00% |
| 2016-10 | 2016-11–2017-10 | 20.75% | 20.70% | 20.92% | 0.00% |
| 2016-11 | 2016-12–2017-11 | 18.67% | 20.70% | 18.86% | 3.03% |
| 2016-12 | 2017-01–2017-12 | 15.52% | 20.70% | 16.55% | 1.82% |
| 2017-01 | 2017-02–2018-01 | 13.64% | 20.70% | 14.07% | 1.26% |
| 2017-02 | 2017-03–2018-02 | 12.39% | 20.70% | 12.45% | 3.36% |
| 2017-03 | 2017-04–2018-03 | 12.28% | 20.70% | 12.46% | 4.39% |
| 2017-04 | 2017-05–2018-04 | 12.45% | 20.70% | 12.82% | 3.60% |
| 2017-05 | 2017-06–2018-05 | 13.31% | 20.70% | 13.74% | 0.00% |
| 2017-06 | 2017-07–2018-06 | 12.89% | 20.70% | 12.99% | 5.27% |
Last daily reference price per calendar month; not a centralized exchange close. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Post-development asset-transfer illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-12 | 2016-01–2016-12 | 29.15% | 20.70% | 27.81% | 14.74% |
| 2016-01 | 2016-02–2017-01 | 31.61% | 20.70% | 31.85% | 0.00% |
| 2016-02 | 2016-03–2017-02 | 24.19% | 20.70% | 21.54% | 4.98% |
| 2016-03 | 2016-04–2017-03 | 26.70% | 20.70% | 26.24% | 0.00% |
| 2016-04 | 2016-05–2017-04 | 24.03% | 20.70% | 22.09% | 0.00% |
| 2016-05 | 2016-06–2017-05 | 24.12% | 20.70% | 20.63% | 0.00% |
| 2016-06 | 2016-07–2017-06 | 24.99% | 20.70% | 20.36% | 15.13% |
| 2016-07 | 2016-08–2017-07 | 29.59% | 20.70% | 28.27% | 8.41% |
| 2016-08 | 2016-09–2017-08 | 31.54% | 20.70% | 29.20% | 0.00% |
| 2016-09 | 2016-10–2017-09 | 28.50% | 20.70% | 24.75% | 0.00% |
| 2016-10 | 2016-11–2017-10 | 22.09% | 20.70% | 19.16% | 0.00% |
| 2016-11 | 2016-12–2017-11 | 21.48% | 20.70% | 19.71% | 0.00% |
| 2016-12 | 2017-01–2017-12 | 23.00% | 20.70% | 18.71% | 0.05% |
| 2017-01 | 2017-02–2018-01 | 21.00% | 20.70% | 18.93% | 0.00% |
| 2017-02 | 2017-03–2018-02 | 21.23% | 20.70% | 17.19% | 8.97% |
| 2017-03 | 2017-04–2018-03 | 25.97% | 20.70% | 24.14% | 0.00% |
| 2017-04 | 2017-05–2018-04 | 22.79% | 20.70% | 17.83% | 0.00% |
| 2017-05 | 2017-06–2018-05 | 28.64% | 20.70% | 19.09% | 0.00% |
| 2017-06 | 2017-07–2018-06 | 28.19% | 20.70% | 23.92% | 0.00% |
| 2017-07 | 2017-08–2018-07 | 26.91% | 20.70% | 21.02% | 0.00% |
| 2017-08 | 2017-09–2018-08 | 29.27% | 20.70% | 17.70% | 8.56% |
| 2017-09 | 2017-10–2018-09 | 36.07% | 20.70% | 29.81% | 0.00% |
| 2017-10 | 2017-11–2018-10 | 32.70% | 20.70% | 21.00% | 1.90% |
| 2017-11 | 2017-12–2018-11 | 33.92% | 20.70% | 20.23% | 60.25% |
| 2017-12 | 2018-01–2018-12 | 34.24% | 20.70% | 21.39% | 73.51% |
| 2018-01 | 2018-02–2019-01 | 59.19% | 20.70% | 52.63% | 66.07% |
| 2018-02 | 2018-03–2019-02 | 58.77% | 20.70% | 47.81% | 66.91% |
| 2018-03 | 2018-04–2019-03 | 77.71% | 20.70% | 74.11% | 50.74% |
| 2018-04 | 2018-05–2019-04 | 69.66% | 20.70% | 56.42% | 63.05% |
| 2018-05 | 2018-06–2019-05 | 75.48% | 20.70% | 72.25% | 54.40% |
| 2018-06 | 2018-07–2019-06 | 80.05% | 20.70% | 77.00% | 46.51% |
| 2018-07 | 2018-08–2019-07 | 75.88% | 20.70% | 68.43% | 55.86% |
| 2018-08 | 2018-09–2019-08 | 74.97% | 20.70% | 73.06% | 51.46% |
| 2018-09 | 2018-10–2019-09 | 76.28% | 20.70% | 73.74% | 48.37% |
| 2018-10 | 2018-11–2019-10 | 74.45% | 20.70% | 73.09% | 45.93% |
| 2018-11 | 2018-12–2019-11 | 80.84% | 20.70% | 85.13% | 14.17% |
| 2018-12 | 2019-01–2019-12 | 73.52% | 20.70% | 76.58% | 7.51% |
| 2019-01 | 2019-02–2020-01 | 73.48% | 20.70% | 75.50% | 0.00% |
| 2019-02 | 2019-03–2020-02 | 70.02% | 20.70% | 70.11% | 0.00% |
| 2019-03 | 2019-04–2020-03 | 65.17% | 20.70% | 63.74% | 0.00% |
| 2019-04 | 2019-05–2020-04 | 49.42% | 20.70% | 47.35% | 0.00% |
| 2019-05 | 2019-06–2020-05 | 36.98% | 20.70% | 31.45% | 24.82% |
| 2019-06 | 2019-07–2020-06 | 37.24% | 20.70% | 33.37% | 40.67% |
| 2019-07 | 2019-08–2020-07 | 41.26% | 20.70% | 42.49% | 36.05% |
| 2019-08 | 2019-09–2020-08 | 43.60% | 20.70% | 43.80% | 33.03% |
| 2019-09 | 2019-10–2020-09 | 52.14% | 20.70% | 53.32% | 22.34% |
| 2019-10 | 2019-11–2020-10 | 46.98% | 20.70% | 44.31% | 29.74% |
| 2019-11 | 2019-12–2020-11 | 49.44% | 20.70% | 48.50% | 14.87% |
| 2019-12 | 2020-01–2020-12 | 51.54% | 20.70% | 48.03% | 10.25% |
Last daily reference price per calendar month; not a centralized exchange close. Out of training population: price/asset/country or portfolio transfer; numeric probabilities unvalidated. Post-development asset-transfer illustration.
| Forecast origin | Outcome window | Model | Constant | Full model | Observed future loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-11 | 2019-12–2020-11 | 49.44% | 20.70% | 48.50% | 14.87% |
| 2019-12 | 2020-01–2020-12 | 51.54% | 20.70% | 48.03% | 10.25% |
| 2020-01 | 2020-02–2021-01 | 39.35% | 20.70% | 31.69% | 31.26% |
| 2020-02 | 2020-03–2021-02 | 44.78% | 20.70% | 42.25% | 25.05% |
| 2020-03 | 2020-04–2021-03 | 61.43% | 20.70% | 62.13% | 0.00% |
| 2020-04 | 2020-05–2021-04 | 49.14% | 20.70% | 42.44% | 0.00% |
| 2020-05 | 2020-06–2021-05 | 37.20% | 20.70% | 36.16% | 3.07% |
| 2020-06 | 2020-07–2021-06 | 32.74% | 20.70% | 34.78% | 0.00% |
| 2020-07 | 2020-08–2021-07 | 29.25% | 20.70% | 27.53% | 4.99% |
| 2020-08 | 2020-09–2021-08 | 29.14% | 20.70% | 29.46% | 7.76% |
| 2020-09 | 2020-10–2021-09 | 32.76% | 20.70% | 33.72% | 0.00% |
| 2020-10 | 2020-11–2021-10 | 30.01% | 20.70% | 26.73% | 0.00% |
| 2020-11 | 2020-12–2021-11 | 30.88% | 20.70% | 24.27% | 0.00% |
| 2020-12 | 2021-01–2021-12 | 32.92% | 20.70% | 24.04% | 0.00% |
| 2021-01 | 2021-02–2022-01 | 32.15% | 20.70% | 26.85% | 0.00% |
| 2021-02 | 2021-03–2022-02 | 31.92% | 20.70% | 23.10% | 22.69% |
| 2021-03 | 2021-04–2022-03 | 25.19% | 20.70% | 16.58% | 40.36% |
| 2021-04 | 2021-05–2022-04 | 26.83% | 20.70% | 21.38% | 39.27% |
| 2021-05 | 2021-06–2022-05 | 59.84% | 20.70% | 58.78% | 14.69% |
| 2021-06 | 2021-07–2022-06 | 62.49% | 20.70% | 55.66% | 44.87% |
| 2021-07 | 2021-08–2022-07 | 55.15% | 20.70% | 45.60% | 53.74% |
| 2021-08 | 2021-09–2022-08 | 48.99% | 20.70% | 40.69% | 59.06% |
| 2021-09 | 2021-10–2022-09 | 52.69% | 20.70% | 46.82% | 55.84% |
| 2021-10 | 2021-11–2022-10 | 37.52% | 20.70% | 28.28% | 68.53% |
| 2021-11 | 2021-12–2022-11 | 40.98% | 20.70% | 38.41% | 69.92% |
| 2021-12 | 2022-01–2022-12 | 51.09% | 20.70% | 51.90% | 64.35% |
| 2022-01 | 2022-02–2023-01 | 60.34% | 20.70% | 61.25% | 57.04% |
| 2022-02 | 2022-03–2023-02 | 52.72% | 20.70% | 50.55% | 61.73% |
| 2022-03 | 2022-04–2023-03 | 47.68% | 20.70% | 47.75% | 63.73% |
| 2022-04 | 2022-05–2023-04 | 56.83% | 20.70% | 60.31% | 56.19% |
| 2022-05 | 2022-06–2023-05 | 57.02% | 20.70% | 58.01% | 48.09% |
| 2022-06 | 2022-07–2023-06 | 75.84% | 20.70% | 80.40% | 14.53% |
| 2022-07 | 2022-08–2023-07 | 72.78% | 20.70% | 69.96% | 29.25% |
| 2022-08 | 2022-09–2023-08 | 74.83% | 20.70% | 76.83% | 17.48% |
| 2022-09 | 2022-10–2023-09 | 75.33% | 20.70% | 75.70% | 14.98% |
| 2022-10 | 2022-11–2023-10 | 68.30% | 20.70% | 69.02% | 19.36% |
| 2022-11 | 2022-12–2023-11 | 67.87% | 20.70% | 72.06% | 3.80% |
| 2022-12 | 2023-01–2023-12 | 67.93% | 20.70% | 69.61% | 0.00% |
| 2023-01 | 2023-02–2024-01 | 64.57% | 20.70% | 59.85% | 0.00% |
| 2023-02 | 2023-03–2024-02 | 63.75% | 20.70% | 64.41% | 0.00% |
| 2023-03 | 2023-04–2024-03 | 50.06% | 20.70% | 48.99% | 8.98% |
| 2023-04 | 2023-05–2024-04 | 38.77% | 20.70% | 40.73% | 11.60% |
| 2023-05 | 2023-06–2024-05 | 37.83% | 20.70% | 40.92% | 4.64% |
| 2023-06 | 2023-07–2024-06 | 24.86% | 20.70% | 23.16% | 14.86% |
| 2023-07 | 2023-08–2024-07 | 26.07% | 20.70% | 26.72% | 11.17% |
| 2023-08 | 2023-09–2024-08 | 31.22% | 20.70% | 32.00% | 0.00% |
| 2023-09 | 2023-10–2024-09 | 29.27% | 20.70% | 27.98% | 0.00% |
| 2023-10 | 2023-11–2024-10 | 25.27% | 20.70% | 21.84% | 0.00% |
| 2023-11 | 2023-12–2024-11 | 23.26% | 20.70% | 20.81% | 0.00% |
Download full protocol, model comparisons and chart data. Independent audits rebuilt raw labels, features, partition membership, predictions, block intervals and all 490 historical case rows. Those arithmetic checks do not establish economic validity.
April 1872 = 100; September 1873 marks the panic; June 1877 is the later trough, 47.81% below the reference. These dates are distinct. The compact dashboard’s fixed ±24-month window ends before this trough.
| Month | Index · April 1872 = 100 |
|---|---|
| 1868-01 | 76.327 |
| 1868-02 | 78.097 |
| 1868-03 | 77.699 |
| 1868-04 | 77.235 |
| 1868-05 | 79.912 |
| 1868-06 | 81.217 |
| 1868-07 | 81.239 |
| 1868-08 | 80.398 |
| 1868-09 | 81.106 |
| 1868-10 | 82.323 |
| 1868-11 | 80.000 |
| 1868-12 | 81.593 |
| 1869-01 | 84.580 |
| 1869-02 | 85.221 |
| 1869-03 | 84.580 |
| 1869-04 | 86.040 |
| 1869-05 | 89.801 |
| 1869-06 | 90.619 |
| 1869-07 | 90.420 |
| 1869-08 | 91.681 |
| 1869-09 | 85.730 |
| 1869-10 | 85.044 |
| 1869-11 | 84.425 |
| 1869-12 | 83.009 |
| 1870-01 | 84.226 |
| 1870-02 | 86.925 |
| 1870-03 | 86.394 |
| 1870-04 | 87.743 |
| 1870-05 | 91.195 |
| 1870-06 | 91.903 |
| 1870-07 | 89.093 |
| 1870-08 | 87.478 |
| 1870-09 | 88.252 |
| 1870-10 | 88.628 |
| 1870-11 | 88.628 |
| 1870-12 | 87.633 |
| 1871-01 | 87.832 |
| 1871-02 | 88.739 |
| 1871-03 | 90.642 |
| 1871-04 | 93.031 |
| 1871-05 | 95.133 |
| 1871-06 | 94.447 |
| 1871-07 | 92.721 |
| 1871-08 | 93.319 |
| 1871-09 | 93.761 |
| 1871-10 | 89.049 |
| 1871-11 | 89.779 |
| 1871-12 | 91.549 |
| 1872-01 | 93.562 |
| 1872-02 | 94.137 |
| 1872-03 | 97.058 |
| 1872-04 | 100.000 |
| 1872-05 | 99.624 |
| 1872-06 | 98.584 |
| 1872-07 | 97.765 |
| 1872-08 | 96.394 |
| 1872-09 | 95.199 |
| 1872-10 | 95.022 |
| 1872-11 | 94.425 |
| 1872-12 | 96.947 |
| 1873-01 | 97.898 |
| 1873-02 | 99.093 |
| 1873-03 | 98.274 |
| 1873-04 | 96.593 |
| 1873-05 | 96.748 |
| 1873-06 | 95.929 |
| 1873-07 | 95.597 |
| 1873-08 | 95.088 |
| 1873-09 | 87.920 |
| 1873-10 | 80.575 |
| 1873-11 | 77.677 |
| 1873-12 | 84.690 |
| 1874-01 | 89.292 |
| 1874-02 | 91.748 |
| 1874-03 | 90.111 |
| 1874-04 | 87.655 |
| 1874-05 | 85.398 |
| 1874-06 | 84.580 |
| 1874-07 | 84.712 |
| 1874-08 | 85.221 |
| 1874-09 | 86.482 |
| 1874-10 | 86.195 |
| 1874-11 | 86.394 |
| 1874-12 | 86.504 |
| 1875-01 | 87.190 |
| 1875-02 | 86.881 |
| 1875-03 | 87.699 |
| 1875-04 | 88.628 |
| 1875-05 | 84.801 |
| 1875-06 | 83.230 |
| 1875-07 | 83.296 |
| 1875-08 | 83.628 |
| 1875-09 | 82.788 |
| 1875-10 | 81.637 |
| 1875-11 | 82.699 |
| 1875-12 | 82.699 |
| 1876-01 | 84.712 |
| 1876-02 | 85.996 |
| 1876-03 | 86.327 |
| 1876-04 | 82.920 |
| 1876-05 | 79.491 |
| 1876-06 | 78.761 |
| 1876-07 | 77.920 |
| 1876-08 | 74.447 |
| 1876-09 | 70.155 |
| 1876-10 | 69.447 |
| 1876-11 | 67.965 |
| 1876-12 | 67.588 |
| 1877-01 | 67.013 |
| 1877-02 | 62.810 |
| 1877-03 | 59.845 |
| 1877-04 | 55.465 |
| 1877-05 | 55.288 |
| 1877-06 | 52.190 |
| 1877-07 | 53.960 |
| 1877-08 | 57.456 |
| 1877-09 | 61.283 |
| 1877-10 | 63.009 |
| 1877-11 | 61.881 |
| 1877-12 | 61.593 |
| 1878-01 | 61.593 |
| 1878-02 | 60.354 |
| 1878-03 | 61.394 |
| 1878-04 | 63.296 |
| 1878-05 | 63.319 |
| 1878-06 | 65.022 |
| 1878-07 | 66.173 |
| 1878-08 | 65.398 |
| 1878-09 | 66.814 |
| 1878-10 | 66.173 |
| 1878-11 | 65.929 |
| 1878-12 | 65.686 |
At month-end, estimate the chance that the next monthly observation is at least 20% below the highest of the most recent 12 monthly observations. Only estimate entry when the current observation is above that barrier. The barrier is fixed when the estimate is made. An ineligible month is blank, not a zero chance of further losses.
Hₜ = max(Pₜ₋₁₁, …, Pₜ) Eligible if Pₜ > 0.8 Hₜ Yₜ₊₁ = 1 if Pₜ₊₁ ≤ 0.8 Hₜ, otherwise 0 pₜ₊₁ = 1 / (1 + exp(−[β₀ + Σ βⱼ(xⱼ−μⱼ)/sⱼ]))
Inputs: one-month log return, 12-month log return, sample standard deviation of the last 12 monthly log returns, and drawdown from the trailing 12-month peak. These return-path variables measure proximity to a drawdown barrier. Valuations, capex, interest rates and energy commitments are separate diagnostics; this model has not established their incremental predictive value.
| feature | training mean | training sd | coefficient |
|---|---|---|---|
| ret1 | 0.017 | 0.063 | -0.095 |
| ret12 | 0.173 | 0.218 | -0.206 |
| vol12 | 0.059 | 0.034 | 0.388 |
| drawdown | -0.049 | 0.056 | -1.095 |
Intercept: -4.160481551. Ridge penalty: 0.01. Training base rate: 3.94%. Feature scaling uses the training population standard deviation; the volatility predictor uses a sample standard deviation.
Greenwood, Shleifer & You, Bubbles for Fama motivates studying run-ups, volatility and subsequent crash risk across the full opportunity set. This one-month barrier target is an original exploratory design, not a replication of that paper’s longer-horizon crash definition. Proper scoring rules motivate evaluating probability forecasts with Brier error and calibration, rather than showcasing a few famous crashes.
The separate price-exuberance percentile on the dashboard uses a right-tailed autoregression and bootstrap null. It measures an unusual price path, not the probability a bubble exists. Its original protocol, sensitivity checks and ten-case benchmark remain below.
49 US industry total-return portfolios. Training target months through December 1984; development 1987–1997; test 2000–2024. Two-year gaps separate periods. Standardization is fitted on training only; development Brier error selects a penalty from four frozen candidates. Test data do not select features, coefficients, threshold or calibration. The 10% alarm cutoff was fixed before evaluation.
The protocol was frozen before the first fit in this task, not prospectively registered decades ago. The data are revised; the literature itself incorporates historical knowledge. Industry observations overlap, so uncertainty resamples entire calendar years with all industries together. It does not fully capture dependence across years or model-selection uncertainty.
Charts before training ends are future-trained backcasts; the 1989 case belongs to the development era. Later asset examples are transfers to different markets and often monthly means. None are contemporaneous, point-in-time trading records.
Lower Brier score is better. The baseline is the constant training event prevalence, kept fixed in the test. The ten selected boom/bust charts are not used to calculate these rates.
| sample | eligible observations | entries | Brier | baseline Brier | skill | improvement 95 interval | hits | false alarms | misses | true negatives | precision | recall |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US industry test | 12649.000 | 507.000 | 0.032 | 0.038 | 17.36% | 0.004132 to 0.010261 | 361.000 | 984.000 | 146.000 | 11158.000 | 26.84% | 71.20% |
| Nasdaq transfer test | 251.000 | 6.000 | 0.022 | 0.024 | 5.97% | -0.002002 to 0.005318 | 4.000 | 16.000 | 2.000 | 229.000 | 20.00% | 66.67% |
The industry test improves Brier error, but its probabilities are visibly miscalibrated. Nasdaq has only six events; its improvement interval includes zero. At 10%, the Nasdaq model catches four entries, misses two, and produces sixteen false alarms. An always-no-entry prediction has higher classification accuracy; rarity makes “accuracy” a poor headline here.
Each dot is a forecast bin; the diagonal is perfect calibration. Dot size reflects sample size. Hover for exact values.
| forecast bin | months | predicted | observed | events |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00%–1.00% | 6510.000 | 0.57% | 0.11% | 7.000 |
| 1.00%–2.50% | 2521.000 | 1.59% | 0.60% | 15.000 |
| 2.50%–5.00% | 1321.000 | 3.52% | 3.03% | 40.000 |
| 5.00%–10.00% | 952.000 | 7.06% | 8.82% | 84.000 |
| 10.00%–20.00% | 792.000 | 14.28% | 20.08% | 159.000 |
| 20.00%–40.00% | 521.000 | 26.03% | 36.66% | 191.000 |
| 40.00%–60.00% | 30.000 | 47.03% | 36.67% | 11.000 |
| 60.00%–80.00% | 2.000 | 72.12% | 0.00% | 0.000 |
| 80.00%–100.00% | 0.000 | — | — | 0.000 |
The model is mostly a drawdown-entry detector, not an early warning of fundamental overvaluation or a market top. The original ten example peak-month estimates are all below the 10% alert threshold; the next monthly observation at those peaks also does not satisfy this narrowly defined target.
US housing declined about 27.4% from July 2006 to February 2012, yet generated no crossing under this rolling 12-month definition in 2006–2012. A slowly declining peak lowers the barrier. This limitation is retained openly, rather than changing the target after seeing a miss. Repeated entries after recovery are possible; event counts are not counts of distinct bubbles.
Independent audits recomputed labels, standardization, sample volatility, predictions, Brier errors and confusion counts. The chart pipeline independently reproduces exported probabilities within 5 × 10⁻¹¹. These numerical checks do not establish economic validity or calibrated AI probabilities.
US railroads use Macaulay’s monthly chain price index, independently matched between NBER originals and FRED, with zero discrepancies. This is a stock-price index, not total return. Unreliable 1855–1856 values are excluded. The declared 1868–1878 window peaks in April 1872; the September 1873 panic is 17 months later. The subsequent June 1877 trough is 47.81% below that peak. The compact chart is a shorter fixed comparison window. The full series is plotted above.
High-grade railroad bond yields are a separate monthly borrowing-cost series. They are not equity yields or P/E. A financing panic can occur without an aggregate railroad equity price bubble.
Digitized approximation from Campbell (2013), Figure 1: 417 original PDF vector vertices. Weekly indices, January 1843 ≈ 1000; allowance of ±2 index points and inferred dates approximately ±1 week. Solid / dashed curves assume 0% / 100% shareholder loss on delisting. Dividends are excluded; returns adjust for capital calls. Four independently printed peak/trough values match extraction within one point. These are not raw transaction data and do not enter the monthly forecasting benchmark.
Campbell, Deriving the Railway Mania and Myopic Rationality in a Mania document partly paid shares and future capital calls. Investors could lose their paid stake and face additional calls; the economics differ from fully paid stock. Short-run dividend expectations explain part of the mania in this literature, so the price curve alone is not proof of irrationality.
| date | rail n | rail mean dividend yield pct | rail sd dividend yield pct | nonrail n | nonrail mean dividend yield pct | nonrail sd dividend yield pct | rail mean par equity million gbp | nonrail mean par equity million gbp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1843-01-06 | 19 | 5.64 | 2.42 | 22 | 4.75 | 1 | 1.44 | 1.72 |
| 1843-12-29 | 22 | 3.58 | 1.34 | 22 | 4.61 | 1.01 | 1.38 | 1.72 |
| 1844-12-27 | 21 | 3.59 | 1.03 | 22 | 4.35 | 1.16 | 1.55 | 1.73 |
| 1845-08-08 | 22 | 3.15 | 1.12 | 22 | 4.26 | 1.04 | 1.87 | 1.73 |
| 1845-12-26 | 21 | 3.73 | 1.1 | 22 | 4.74 | 1.62 | 2.01 | 1.73 |
| 1846-12-25 | 19 | 4.65 | 1.3 | 22 | 5.02 | 2.2 | 2.48 | 1.73 |
| 1847-12-31 | 18 | 5.89 | 1.49 | 21 | 5.15 | 1.43 | 4.14 | 1.77 |
| 1848-12-29 | 21 | 6.75 | 1.7 | 21 | 5.48 | 1.99 | 4.82 | 1.77 |
| 1849-12-28 | 15 | 6.28 | 3.01 | 22 | 4.94 | 1.93 | 5.03 | 1.75 |
| 1850-12-27 | 18 | 3.65 | 0.92 | 22 | 4.84 | 1.61 | 5.9 | 1.76 |
Cross-sectional means. Ten selected dates, not a complete monthly series; reciprocal yield is not a measured P/E.
| date | established dividend payer n | established dividend payer price par | established nonpayer n | established nonpayer price par | new rail n | new rail price par |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1843-01-06 | 19 | 1.02 | 3 | 0.55 | 0 | |
| 1843-12-29 | 22 | 1.25 | 4 | 0.59 | 0 | |
| 1844-12-27 | 21 | 1.5 | 2 | 0.89 | 39 | 1.06 |
| 1845-08-08 | 21 | 1.8 | 3 | 1.08 | 71 | 1.14 |
| 1845-12-26 | 21 | 1.6 | 2 | 1.08 | 115 | 1.05 |
| 1846-12-25 | 18 | 1.36 | 3 | 1.11 | 100 | 1.01 |
| 1847-12-31 | 17 | 1.12 | 0 | 76 | 0.89 | |
| 1848-12-29 | 20 | 0.88 | 0 | 60 | 0.74 | |
| 1849-12-28 | 15 | 0.7 | 4 | 0.43 | 59 | 0.66 |
| 1850-12-27 | 18 | 0.77 | 3 | 0.49 | 46 | 0.67 |
Part-paid shares are adjusted to fully paid equivalents by adding future calls discounted at 3% to price and par. Author-modeled call-adjusted ratios, not P/B or unadjusted share prices.
| royal assent cohort | n | average paid up pct | partial paid return pct | partial paid return se pct | hypothetical full paid return pct | hypothetical full paid return se pct | return difference pct | return difference se pct |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1844 | 10 | 26.7 | 57.5 | 19.5 | 16.6 | 6.2 | 40.9 | 14.8 |
| 1845 | 29 | 24 | 36 | 16.4 | 8.7 | 4 | 27.3 | 12.7 |
| 1846 | 17 | 24.7 | 21.8 | 16.1 | 6.6 | 4 | 15.2 | 12.5 |
| 1847 | 2 | 16.3 | -19.6 | 55.4 | -2.7 | 9.2 | -17 | 46.1 |
| Overall | 58 | 24.4 | 33.7 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 2.6 | 24.6 | 7.9 |
Royal-assent cohorts, not calendar annual returns. Partial-paid observed returns and hypothetical fully-paid returns differ in financing assumptions; the 1847 cohort contains only two firms.
Shared price normalization is for visual comparison only and uses a hindsight reference. Risk estimates use only earlier observations and frozen coefficients. Annual P/E points are not filled into missing months. Japan uses NRI 350 reported earnings; China uses SSE year-end observations. Dot-com and current AI valuations use broad US market context, not Nasdaq or AI-only P/E.
Reference 1872-04. US railroad monthly chain price index. future-trained historical illustration. April 1872 price peak; September 1873 panic is +17 months. Window is not the full bust.
First exposed: Railroad shareholders faced falling equity values; railroad bondholders and lending banks faced defaults and refinancing failures. Recoveries depended on the security and reorganization, so the stock-price index is not a bondholder loss estimate.
Transmission: Railroad funding difficulties contributed to Jay Cooke & Co. suspending payments on September 18, 1873. Loss of confidence spread to other banks and depositors, disrupting withdrawals, credit, and payments; business failures and unemployment transmitted the shock beyond securities holders.
Public burden: Workers, households, and businesses bore wider economic disruption. These sources do not establish a comprehensive taxpayer-loss total or a public/private share of losses; neither is estimated here.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 · Risk evidence 2 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1870-04 | -24.000 | 87.743 | 1870-03 | 1.540 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-05 | -23.000 | 91.195 | 1870-04 | 1.125 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-06 | -22.000 | 91.903 | 1870-05 | 0.525 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-07 | -21.000 | 89.093 | 1870-06 | 0.497 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-08 | -20.000 | 87.478 | 1870-07 | 0.993 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-09 | -19.000 | 88.252 | 1870-08 | 1.406 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-10 | -18.000 | 88.628 | 1870-09 | 0.978 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-11 | -17.000 | 88.628 | 1870-10 | 0.898 | 0.000 | true |
| 1870-12 | -16.000 | 87.633 | 1870-11 | 0.895 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-01 | -15.000 | 87.832 | 1870-12 | 1.109 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-02 | -14.000 | 88.739 | 1871-01 | 1.051 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-03 | -13.000 | 90.642 | 1871-02 | 0.858 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-04 | -12.000 | 93.031 | 1871-03 | 0.556 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-05 | -11.000 | 95.133 | 1871-04 | 0.423 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-06 | -10.000 | 94.447 | 1871-05 | 0.422 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-07 | -9.000 | 92.721 | 1871-06 | 0.515 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-08 | -8.000 | 93.319 | 1871-07 | 0.719 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-09 | -7.000 | 93.761 | 1871-08 | 0.589 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-10 | -6.000 | 89.049 | 1871-09 | 0.541 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-11 | -5.000 | 89.779 | 1871-10 | 1.753 | 0.000 | true |
| 1871-12 | -4.000 | 91.549 | 1871-11 | 1.376 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-01 | -3.000 | 93.562 | 1871-12 | 0.922 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-02 | -2.000 | 94.137 | 1872-01 | 0.604 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-03 | -1.000 | 97.058 | 1872-02 | 0.552 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-04 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 1872-03 | 0.435 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-05 | 1.000 | 99.624 | 1872-04 | 0.435 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-06 | 2.000 | 98.584 | 1872-05 | 0.502 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-07 | 3.000 | 97.765 | 1872-06 | 0.623 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-08 | 4.000 | 96.394 | 1872-07 | 0.715 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-09 | 5.000 | 95.199 | 1872-08 | 0.964 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-10 | 6.000 | 95.022 | 1872-09 | 1.235 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-11 | 7.000 | 94.425 | 1872-10 | 1.111 | 0.000 | true |
| 1872-12 | 8.000 | 96.947 | 1872-11 | 1.276 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-01 | 9.000 | 97.898 | 1872-12 | 0.749 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-02 | 10.000 | 99.093 | 1873-01 | 0.641 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-03 | 11.000 | 98.274 | 1873-02 | 0.505 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-04 | 12.000 | 96.593 | 1873-03 | 0.620 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-05 | 13.000 | 96.748 | 1873-04 | 0.825 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-06 | 14.000 | 95.929 | 1873-05 | 0.701 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-07 | 15.000 | 95.597 | 1873-06 | 0.832 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-08 | 16.000 | 95.088 | 1873-07 | 0.876 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-09 | 17.000 | 87.920 | 1873-08 | 0.956 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-10 | 18.000 | 80.575 | 1873-09 | 5.156 | 0.000 | true |
| 1873-11 | 19.000 | 77.677 | 1873-10 | 21.809 | 1.000 | true |
| 1873-12 | 20.000 | 84.690 | 1873-11 | — | — | false |
| 1874-01 | 21.000 | 89.292 | 1873-12 | 9.462 | 0.000 | true |
| 1874-02 | 22.000 | 91.748 | 1874-01 | 4.266 | 0.000 | true |
| 1874-03 | 23.000 | 90.111 | 1874-02 | 2.393 | 0.000 | true |
| 1874-04 | 24.000 | 87.655 | 1874-03 | 2.693 | 0.000 | true |
No verified P/E. unavailable. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
No observations acquired.
No observations acquired.
| date | offset | yield |
|---|---|---|
| 1870-04 | -24.000 | 6.403 |
| 1870-05 | -23.000 | 6.350 |
| 1870-06 | -22.000 | 6.304 |
| 1870-07 | -21.000 | 6.297 |
| 1870-08 | -20.000 | 6.368 |
| 1870-09 | -19.000 | 6.394 |
| 1870-10 | -18.000 | 6.412 |
| 1870-11 | -17.000 | 6.431 |
| 1870-12 | -16.000 | 6.468 |
| 1871-01 | -15.000 | 6.418 |
| 1871-02 | -14.000 | 6.383 |
| 1871-03 | -13.000 | 6.369 |
| 1871-04 | -12.000 | 6.355 |
| 1871-05 | -11.000 | 6.312 |
| 1871-06 | -10.000 | 6.307 |
| 1871-07 | -9.000 | 6.301 |
| 1871-08 | -8.000 | 6.270 |
| 1871-09 | -7.000 | 6.250 |
| 1871-10 | -6.000 | 6.368 |
| 1871-11 | -5.000 | 6.412 |
| 1871-12 | -4.000 | 6.359 |
| 1872-01 | -3.000 | 6.174 |
| 1872-02 | -2.000 | 6.139 |
| 1872-03 | -1.000 | 6.213 |
| 1872-04 | 0.000 | 6.199 |
| 1872-05 | 1.000 | 6.196 |
| 1872-06 | 2.000 | 6.155 |
| 1872-07 | 3.000 | 6.074 |
| 1872-08 | 4.000 | 6.131 |
| 1872-09 | 5.000 | 6.189 |
| 1872-10 | 6.000 | 6.224 |
| 1872-11 | 7.000 | 6.262 |
| 1872-12 | 8.000 | 6.266 |
| 1873-01 | 9.000 | 6.190 |
| 1873-02 | 10.000 | 6.166 |
| 1873-03 | 11.000 | 6.170 |
| 1873-04 | 12.000 | 6.187 |
| 1873-05 | 13.000 | 6.160 |
| 1873-06 | 14.000 | 6.118 |
| 1873-07 | 15.000 | 6.062 |
| 1873-08 | 16.000 | 6.062 |
| 1873-09 | 17.000 | 6.166 |
| 1873-10 | 18.000 | 6.486 |
| 1873-11 | 19.000 | 6.497 |
| 1873-12 | 20.000 | 6.304 |
| 1874-01 | 21.000 | 6.080 |
| 1874-02 | 22.000 | 5.979 |
| 1874-03 | 23.000 | 5.966 |
| 1874-04 | 24.000 | 5.943 |
Reference 1929-09. SHILLER_SP · monthly mean / revised. future-trained historical illustration.
First exposed: Equity holders, including investors buying on margin.
Transmission: Brokers and lenders faced margin-loan and liquidity stress; later banking panics harmed depositors and borrowers.
Public burden: Federal Reserve Bank of New York supplied liquidity. Distinguish the1929crash from the later1930–33banking collapse; a crash alone does not establish all Depression losses.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 · Risk evidence 2 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1927-09 | -24.000 | 54.121 | 1927-08 | 0.354 | 0.000 | true |
| 1927-10 | -23.000 | 53.291 | 1927-09 | 0.351 | 0.000 | true |
| 1927-11 | -22.000 | 54.505 | 1927-10 | 0.514 | 0.000 | true |
| 1927-12 | -21.000 | 55.783 | 1927-11 | 0.357 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-01 | -20.000 | 56.006 | 1927-12 | 0.357 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-02 | -19.000 | 55.335 | 1928-01 | 0.359 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-03 | -18.000 | 58.307 | 1928-02 | 0.491 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-04 | -17.000 | 61.981 | 1928-03 | 0.348 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-05 | -16.000 | 63.898 | 1928-04 | 0.341 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-06 | -15.000 | 60.767 | 1928-05 | 0.358 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-07 | -14.000 | 61.214 | 1928-06 | 1.209 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-08 | -13.000 | 63.195 | 1928-07 | 0.986 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-09 | -12.000 | 67.636 | 1928-08 | 0.525 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-10 | -11.000 | 69.010 | 1928-09 | 0.404 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-11 | -10.000 | 73.674 | 1928-10 | 0.412 | 0.000 | true |
| 1928-12 | -9.000 | 73.962 | 1928-11 | 0.379 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-01 | -8.000 | 79.425 | 1928-12 | 0.426 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-02 | -7.000 | 79.840 | 1929-01 | 0.370 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-03 | -6.000 | 81.246 | 1929-02 | 0.395 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-04 | -5.000 | 80.767 | 1929-03 | 0.399 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-05 | -4.000 | 81.981 | 1929-04 | 0.490 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-06 | -3.000 | 83.546 | 1929-05 | 0.430 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-07 | -2.000 | 90.990 | 1929-06 | 0.366 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-08 | -1.000 | 96.166 | 1929-07 | 0.322 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-09 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 1929-08 | 0.332 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-10 | 1.000 | 89.425 | 1929-09 | 0.343 | 0.000 | true |
| 1929-11 | 2.000 | 65.751 | 1929-10 | 4.648 | 1.000 | true |
| 1929-12 | 3.000 | 68.371 | 1929-11 | — | — | false |
| 1930-01 | 4.000 | 69.361 | 1929-12 | — | — | false |
| 1930-02 | 5.000 | 73.706 | 1930-01 | — | — | false |
| 1930-03 | 6.000 | 76.486 | 1930-02 | — | — | false |
| 1930-04 | 7.000 | 81.342 | 1930-03 | — | — | false |
| 1930-05 | 8.000 | 76.486 | 1930-04 | 30.507 | 1.000 | true |
| 1930-06 | 9.000 | 68.754 | 1930-05 | — | — | false |
| 1930-07 | 10.000 | 67.284 | 1930-06 | — | — | false |
| 1930-08 | 11.000 | 66.422 | 1930-07 | — | — | false |
| 1930-09 | 12.000 | 66.390 | 1930-08 | — | — | false |
| 1930-10 | 13.000 | 57.252 | 1930-09 | — | — | false |
| 1930-11 | 14.000 | 53.099 | 1930-10 | — | — | false |
| 1930-12 | 15.000 | 49.553 | 1930-11 | — | — | false |
| 1931-01 | 16.000 | 51.054 | 1930-12 | — | — | false |
| 1931-02 | 17.000 | 54.952 | 1931-01 | — | — | false |
| 1931-03 | 18.000 | 56.006 | 1931-02 | — | — | false |
| 1931-04 | 19.000 | 50.671 | 1931-03 | — | — | false |
| 1931-05 | 20.000 | 45.783 | 1931-04 | — | — | false |
| 1931-06 | 21.000 | 44.313 | 1931-05 | — | — | false |
| 1931-07 | 22.000 | 45.783 | 1931-06 | — | — | false |
| 1931-08 | 23.000 | 44.409 | 1931-07 | — | — | false |
| 1931-09 | 24.000 | 37.796 | 1931-08 | — | — | false |
US broad equity market. monthly; source earnings interpolated. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
| date | offset | pe | cape |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1927-09 | -24.000 | 14.821 | 17.819 |
| 1927-10 | -23.000 | 14.735 | 17.537 |
| 1927-11 | -22.000 | 15.219 | 18.131 |
| 1927-12 | -21.000 | 15.730 | 18.647 |
| 1928-01 | -20.000 | 15.472 | 18.806 |
| 1928-02 | -19.000 | 14.996 | 18.869 |
| 1928-03 | -18.000 | 15.506 | 19.943 |
| 1928-04 | -17.000 | 16.167 | 21.258 |
| 1928-05 | -16.000 | 16.367 | 21.833 |
| 1928-06 | -15.000 | 15.277 | 20.913 |
| 1928-07 | -14.000 | 15.110 | 21.082 |
| 1928-08 | -13.000 | 15.333 | 21.762 |
| 1928-09 | -12.000 | 16.136 | 23.005 |
| 1928-10 | -11.000 | 16.180 | 23.578 |
| 1928-11 | -10.000 | 16.993 | 25.122 |
| 1928-12 | -9.000 | 16.775 | 25.302 |
| 1929-01 | -8.000 | 17.770 | 27.083 |
| 1929-02 | -7.000 | 17.623 | 27.132 |
| 1929-03 | -6.000 | 17.684 | 27.676 |
| 1929-04 | -5.000 | 17.351 | 27.568 |
| 1929-05 | -4.000 | 17.385 | 27.699 |
| 1929-06 | -3.000 | 17.492 | 27.935 |
| 1929-07 | -2.000 | 18.811 | 29.933 |
| 1929-08 | -1.000 | 19.635 | 31.480 |
| 1929-09 | 0.000 | 20.168 | 32.564 |
| 1929-10 | 1.000 | 17.805 | 28.961 |
| 1929-11 | 2.000 | 12.935 | 21.171 |
| 1929-12 | 3.000 | 13.292 | 22.007 |
| 1930-01 | 4.000 | 13.943 | 22.311 |
| 1930-02 | 5.000 | 15.349 | 23.697 |
| 1930-03 | 6.000 | 16.510 | 24.587 |
| 1930-04 | 7.000 | 18.225 | 25.843 |
| 1930-05 | 8.000 | 17.826 | 24.310 |
| 1930-06 | 9.000 | 16.682 | 21.867 |
| 1930-07 | 10.000 | 17.025 | 21.549 |
| 1930-08 | 11.000 | 17.574 | 21.301 |
| 1930-09 | 12.000 | 18.389 | 21.073 |
| 1930-10 | 13.000 | 16.639 | 18.215 |
| 1930-11 | 14.000 | 16.246 | 16.940 |
| 1930-12 | 15.000 | 15.990 | 16.055 |
| 1931-01 | 16.000 | 17.000 | 16.705 |
| 1931-02 | 17.000 | 18.901 | 18.161 |
| 1931-03 | 18.000 | 19.920 | 18.580 |
| 1931-04 | 19.000 | 18.659 | 16.872 |
| 1931-05 | 20.000 | 17.476 | 15.402 |
| 1931-06 | 21.000 | 17.557 | 15.062 |
| 1931-07 | 22.000 | 18.855 | 15.517 |
| 1931-08 | 23.000 | 19.041 | 15.006 |
| 1931-09 | 24.000 | 16.900 | 12.818 |
No observations acquired.
Reference 1980-01. GOLD_WB · monthly mean / revised. future-trained historical illustration.
First exposed: Long gold holders bore the price decline.
Transmission: Leveraged long positions add margin-call exposure; no quantified gold-specific creditor loss allocation acquired.
Public burden: No gold-specific public loss allocation established here. Do not transfer the Hunt brothers silver losses to gold.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1978-01 | -24.000 | 25.645 | 1977-12 | 0.577 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-02 | -23.000 | 26.379 | 1978-01 | 0.396 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-03 | -22.000 | 27.189 | 1978-02 | 0.426 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-04 | -21.000 | 25.955 | 1978-03 | 0.421 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-05 | -20.000 | 26.108 | 1978-04 | 1.258 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-06 | -19.000 | 27.210 | 1978-05 | 1.009 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-07 | -18.000 | 27.947 | 1978-06 | 0.393 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-08 | -17.000 | 30.549 | 1978-07 | 0.398 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-09 | -16.000 | 31.405 | 1978-08 | 0.356 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-10 | -15.000 | 33.679 | 1978-09 | 0.392 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-11 | -14.000 | 30.534 | 1978-10 | 0.368 | 0.000 | true |
| 1978-12 | -13.000 | 30.778 | 1978-11 | 3.736 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-01 | -12.000 | 33.656 | 1978-12 | 2.724 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-02 | -11.000 | 36.379 | 1979-01 | 0.470 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-03 | -10.000 | 35.843 | 1979-02 | 0.463 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-04 | -9.000 | 35.407 | 1979-03 | 0.748 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-05 | -8.000 | 38.144 | 1979-04 | 0.878 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-06 | -7.000 | 41.325 | 1979-05 | 0.438 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-07 | -6.000 | 43.645 | 1979-06 | 0.427 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-08 | -5.000 | 44.545 | 1979-07 | 0.434 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-09 | -4.000 | 52.561 | 1979-08 | 0.475 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-10 | -3.000 | 57.997 | 1979-09 | 0.385 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-11 | -2.000 | 58.046 | 1979-10 | 0.421 | 0.000 | true |
| 1979-12 | -1.000 | 67.388 | 1979-11 | 0.378 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-01 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 1979-12 | 0.278 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-02 | 1.000 | 98.521 | 1980-01 | 0.264 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-03 | 2.000 | 81.974 | 1980-02 | 0.743 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-04 | 3.000 | 76.618 | 1980-03 | 26.426 | 1.000 | true |
| 1980-05 | 4.000 | 76.084 | 1980-04 | — | — | false |
| 1980-06 | 5.000 | 88.955 | 1980-05 | — | — | false |
| 1980-07 | 6.000 | 95.256 | 1980-06 | 6.033 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-08 | 7.000 | 92.868 | 1980-07 | 2.084 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-09 | 8.000 | 99.751 | 1980-08 | 3.994 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-10 | 9.000 | 97.903 | 1980-09 | 0.981 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-11 | 10.000 | 92.516 | 1980-10 | 1.796 | 0.000 | true |
| 1980-12 | 11.000 | 79.706 | 1980-11 | 5.649 | 1.000 | true |
| 1981-01 | 12.000 | 82.538 | 1980-12 | — | — | false |
| 1981-02 | 13.000 | 74.005 | 1981-01 | 26.235 | 1.000 | true |
| 1981-03 | 14.000 | 73.908 | 1981-02 | — | — | false |
| 1981-04 | 15.000 | 73.418 | 1981-03 | — | — | false |
| 1981-05 | 16.000 | 71.034 | 1981-04 | — | — | false |
| 1981-06 | 17.000 | 68.278 | 1981-05 | — | — | false |
| 1981-07 | 18.000 | 60.575 | 1981-06 | — | — | false |
| 1981-08 | 19.000 | 60.737 | 1981-07 | — | — | false |
| 1981-09 | 20.000 | 65.711 | 1981-08 | — | — | false |
| 1981-10 | 21.000 | 64.824 | 1981-09 | — | — | false |
| 1981-11 | 22.000 | 61.212 | 1981-10 | — | — | false |
| 1981-12 | 23.000 | 60.726 | 1981-11 | — | — | false |
| 1982-01 | 24.000 | 56.884 | 1981-12 | — | — | false |
No verified P/E. unavailable. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
No observations acquired.
No observations acquired.
Reference 1989-12. NIKKEI225 · monthly mean / revised. development-era illustration.
First exposed: Shareholders, including corporate cross-holders, banks, insurers and households.
Transmission: The wider land-and-equity bust left nonperforming property loans at banks and reduced lending capacity.
Public burden: Public capital, depositor protection and temporary bank nationalizations shifted some financial-system exposure onto the state. This is the broader Japanese asset/banking crisis, not Nikkei-only loss accounting.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 · Risk evidence 2 · Risk evidence 3 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1987-12 | -24.000 | 59.666 | 1987-11 | 4.790 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-01 | -23.000 | 59.788 | 1987-12 | 3.858 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-02 | -22.000 | 63.787 | 1988-01 | 3.834 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-03 | -21.000 | 67.491 | 1988-02 | 1.106 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-04 | -20.000 | 70.388 | 1988-03 | 0.523 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-05 | -19.000 | 71.970 | 1988-04 | 0.533 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-06 | -18.000 | 73.171 | 1988-05 | 0.555 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-07 | -17.000 | 72.614 | 1988-06 | 0.566 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-08 | -16.000 | 73.366 | 1988-07 | 0.624 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-09 | -15.000 | 72.363 | 1988-08 | 0.534 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-10 | -14.000 | 71.967 | 1988-09 | 0.732 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-11 | -13.000 | 75.376 | 1988-10 | 0.788 | 0.000 | true |
| 1988-12 | -12.000 | 78.026 | 1988-11 | 0.376 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-01 | -11.000 | 81.710 | 1988-12 | 0.372 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-02 | -10.000 | 83.969 | 1989-01 | 0.351 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-03 | -9.000 | 83.839 | 1989-02 | 0.362 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-04 | -8.000 | 87.173 | 1989-03 | 0.403 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-05 | -7.000 | 89.175 | 1989-04 | 0.368 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-06 | -6.000 | 87.560 | 1989-05 | 0.377 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-07 | -5.000 | 88.792 | 1989-06 | 0.605 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-08 | -4.000 | 91.324 | 1989-07 | 0.427 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-09 | -3.000 | 90.906 | 1989-08 | 0.379 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-10 | -2.000 | 92.675 | 1989-09 | 0.426 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-11 | -1.000 | 94.552 | 1989-10 | 0.362 | 0.000 | true |
| 1989-12 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 1989-11 | 0.364 | 0.000 | true |
| 1990-01 | 1.000 | 98.136 | 1989-12 | 0.347 | 0.000 | true |
| 1990-02 | 2.000 | 95.809 | 1990-01 | 0.600 | 0.000 | true |
| 1990-03 | 3.000 | 84.758 | 1990-02 | 1.019 | 0.000 | true |
| 1990-04 | 4.000 | 76.707 | 1990-03 | 12.719 | 1.000 | true |
| 1990-05 | 5.000 | 83.501 | 1990-04 | — | — | false |
| 1990-06 | 6.000 | 84.913 | 1990-05 | 14.460 | 0.000 | true |
| 1990-07 | 7.000 | 84.403 | 1990-06 | 12.135 | 0.000 | true |
| 1990-08 | 8.000 | 70.598 | 1990-07 | 13.824 | 1.000 | true |
| 1990-09 | 9.000 | 62.798 | 1990-08 | — | — | false |
| 1990-10 | 10.000 | 62.486 | 1990-09 | — | — | false |
| 1990-11 | 11.000 | 61.571 | 1990-10 | — | — | false |
| 1990-12 | 12.000 | 62.286 | 1990-11 | — | — | false |
| 1991-01 | 13.000 | 61.186 | 1990-12 | — | — | false |
| 1991-02 | 14.000 | 66.166 | 1991-01 | — | — | false |
| 1991-03 | 15.000 | 69.416 | 1991-02 | — | — | false |
| 1991-04 | 16.000 | 69.446 | 1991-03 | 26.433 | 0.000 | true |
| 1991-05 | 17.000 | 67.817 | 1991-04 | 24.912 | 1.000 | true |
| 1991-06 | 18.000 | 64.368 | 1991-05 | — | — | false |
| 1991-07 | 19.000 | 60.938 | 1991-06 | — | — | false |
| 1991-08 | 20.000 | 59.635 | 1991-07 | 14.773 | 0.000 | true |
| 1991-09 | 21.000 | 60.445 | 1991-08 | 11.081 | 0.000 | true |
| 1991-10 | 22.000 | 64.625 | 1991-09 | 6.796 | 0.000 | true |
| 1991-11 | 23.000 | 62.431 | 1991-10 | 2.026 | 0.000 | true |
| 1991-12 | 24.000 | 58.517 | 1991-11 | 4.391 | 0.000 | true |
NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms. year-end; 1990 is August-end. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
| date | offset | pe | cape |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1987-12 | -24.000 | 50.400 | — |
| 1988-12 | -12.000 | 54.300 | — |
| 1989-12 | 0.000 | 53.700 | — |
| 1990-08 | 8.000 | 36.600 | — |
No observations acquired.
Reference 2000-03. NASDAQCOM · monthly mean / revised. post-development asset-transfer illustration.
First exposed: Public shareholders and private venture investors.
Transmission: Mishkin distinguishes the tech-stock bust from credit-driven bubbles: it was not accompanied by marked bank-balance-sheet deterioration.
Public burden: Macroeconomic easing supported activity; this source does not establish a general reimbursement of dotcom equity losses.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998-03 | -24.000 | 37.087 | 1998-02 | 0.481 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-04 | -23.000 | 38.566 | 1998-03 | 0.453 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-05 | -22.000 | 38.234 | 1998-04 | 0.391 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-06 | -21.000 | 37.388 | 1998-05 | 0.527 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-07 | -20.000 | 40.424 | 1998-06 | 0.893 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-08 | -19.000 | 37.159 | 1998-07 | 0.427 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-09 | -18.000 | 34.633 | 1998-08 | 3.173 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-10 | -17.000 | 33.639 | 1998-09 | 11.122 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-11 | -16.000 | 39.324 | 1998-10 | 16.543 | 0.000 | true |
| 1998-12 | -15.000 | 43.120 | 1998-11 | 0.939 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-01 | -14.000 | 49.090 | 1998-12 | 0.565 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-02 | -13.000 | 49.073 | 1999-01 | 0.506 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-03 | -12.000 | 49.784 | 1999-02 | 0.662 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-04 | -11.000 | 52.840 | 1999-03 | 0.658 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-05 | -10.000 | 52.313 | 1999-04 | 0.607 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-06 | -9.000 | 52.487 | 1999-05 | 0.818 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-07 | -8.000 | 57.074 | 1999-06 | 0.725 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-08 | -7.000 | 55.017 | 1999-07 | 0.564 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-09 | -6.000 | 58.462 | 1999-08 | 1.218 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-10 | -5.000 | 58.615 | 1999-09 | 0.426 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-11 | -4.000 | 67.261 | 1999-10 | 0.438 | 0.000 | true |
| 1999-12 | -3.000 | 77.866 | 1999-11 | 0.352 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-01 | -2.000 | 83.562 | 1999-12 | 0.352 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-02 | -1.000 | 91.836 | 2000-01 | 0.396 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-03 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 2000-02 | 0.349 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-04 | 1.000 | 80.442 | 2000-03 | 0.329 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-05 | 2.000 | 73.463 | 2000-04 | 32.405 | 1.000 | true |
| 2000-06 | 3.000 | 80.481 | 2000-05 | — | — | false |
| 2000-07 | 4.000 | 83.650 | 2000-06 | 24.306 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-08 | 5.000 | 81.399 | 2000-07 | 16.229 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-09 | 6.000 | 80.696 | 2000-08 | 24.611 | 0.000 | true |
| 2000-10 | 7.000 | 69.411 | 2000-09 | 28.032 | 1.000 | true |
| 2000-11 | 8.000 | 63.615 | 2000-10 | — | — | false |
| 2000-12 | 9.000 | 55.337 | 2000-11 | — | — | false |
| 2001-01 | 10.000 | 55.317 | 2000-12 | — | — | false |
| 2001-02 | 11.000 | 51.001 | 2001-01 | — | — | false |
| 2001-03 | 12.000 | 41.363 | 2001-02 | — | — | false |
| 2001-04 | 13.000 | 40.265 | 2001-03 | — | — | false |
| 2001-05 | 14.000 | 45.412 | 2001-04 | — | — | false |
| 2001-06 | 15.000 | 43.974 | 2001-05 | — | — | false |
| 2001-07 | 16.000 | 42.348 | 2001-06 | — | — | false |
| 2001-08 | 17.000 | 40.177 | 2001-07 | — | — | false |
| 2001-09 | 18.000 | 32.757 | 2001-08 | — | — | false |
| 2001-10 | 19.000 | 34.487 | 2001-09 | — | — | false |
| 2001-11 | 20.000 | 38.935 | 2001-10 | — | — | false |
| 2001-12 | 21.000 | 41.177 | 2001-11 | — | — | false |
| 2002-01 | 22.000 | 41.157 | 2001-12 | — | — | false |
| 2002-02 | 23.000 | 37.471 | 2002-01 | 41.606 | 1.000 | true |
| 2002-03 | 24.000 | 38.789 | 2002-02 | 37.039 | 0.000 | true |
US broad market context; not Nasdaq P/E. monthly; source earnings interpolated. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
| date | offset | pe | cape |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1998-03 | -24.000 | 27.234 | 36.297 |
| 1998-04 | -23.000 | 28.264 | 37.277 |
| 1998-05 | -22.000 | 28.305 | 36.957 |
| 1998-06 | -21.000 | 28.442 | 36.802 |
| 1998-07 | -20.000 | 29.904 | 38.260 |
| 1998-08 | -19.000 | 27.997 | 35.423 |
| 1998-09 | -18.000 | 26.795 | 33.532 |
| 1998-10 | -17.000 | 27.197 | 33.773 |
| 1998-11 | -16.000 | 30.247 | 37.369 |
| 1998-12 | -15.000 | 31.558 | 38.820 |
| 1999-01 | -14.000 | 32.920 | 40.577 |
| 1999-02 | -13.000 | 32.670 | 40.400 |
| 1999-03 | -12.000 | 33.394 | 41.356 |
| 1999-04 | -11.000 | 33.998 | 42.705 |
| 1999-05 | -10.000 | 33.186 | 42.557 |
| 1999-06 | -9.000 | 32.242 | 42.181 |
| 1999-07 | -8.000 | 32.881 | 43.828 |
| 1999-08 | -7.000 | 30.886 | 41.931 |
| 1999-09 | -6.000 | 29.986 | 41.323 |
| 1999-10 | -5.000 | 28.658 | 40.553 |
| 1999-11 | -4.000 | 29.743 | 43.208 |
| 1999-12 | -3.000 | 29.659 | 44.198 |
| 2000-01 | -2.000 | 29.036 | 43.773 |
| 2000-02 | -1.000 | 27.764 | 42.186 |
| 2000-03 | 0.000 | 28.306 | 43.221 |
| 2000-04 | 1.000 | 28.501 | 43.529 |
| 2000-05 | 2.000 | 27.492 | 41.966 |
| 2000-06 | 3.000 | 28.158 | 42.782 |
| 2000-07 | 4.000 | 28.050 | 42.758 |
| 2000-08 | 5.000 | 27.971 | 42.870 |
| 2000-09 | 6.000 | 27.338 | 41.898 |
| 2000-10 | 7.000 | 26.496 | 39.370 |
| 2000-11 | 8.000 | 26.897 | 38.782 |
| 2000-12 | 9.000 | 26.619 | 37.274 |
| 2001-01 | 10.000 | 27.550 | 36.979 |
| 2001-02 | 11.000 | 27.806 | 35.835 |
| 2001-03 | 12.000 | 26.097 | 32.326 |
| 2001-04 | 13.000 | 27.959 | 32.174 |
| 2001-05 | 14.000 | 32.021 | 34.075 |
| 2001-06 | 15.000 | 33.670 | 33.069 |
| 2001-07 | 16.000 | 35.463 | 32.163 |
| 2001-08 | 17.000 | 37.849 | 31.404 |
| 2001-09 | 18.000 | 36.900 | 27.667 |
| 2001-10 | 19.000 | 39.722 | 28.577 |
| 2001-11 | 20.000 | 43.623 | 30.005 |
| 2001-12 | 21.000 | 46.372 | 30.500 |
| 2002-01 | 22.000 | 46.175 | 30.277 |
| 2002-02 | 23.000 | 44.568 | 29.086 |
| 2002-03 | 24.000 | 46.712 | 30.292 |
| date | offset | company | observationLabel | capexOCF | capexRevenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998-06-30 | -21.000 | MSFT | MSFT fiscal year ended 1998-06-30 | 9.535 | 4.529 |
| 1998-12-26 | -15.000 | INTC | INTC fiscal year ended 1998-12-26 | 38.701 | 13.539 |
| 1999-06-30 | -9.000 | MSFT | MSFT fiscal year ended 1999-06-30 | 5.813 | 2.952 |
| 1999-12-25 | -3.000 | INTC | INTC fiscal year ended 1999-12-25 | 30.022 | 11.579 |
| 2000-06-30 | 3.000 | MSFT | MSFT fiscal year ended 2000-06-30 | 6.296 | 3.829 |
| 2000-12-30 | 9.000 | INTC | INTC fiscal year ended 2000-12-30 | 52.031 | 19.789 |
| 2001-06-30 | 15.000 | MSFT | MSFT fiscal year ended 2001-06-30 | 8.218 | 4.360 |
| 2001-12-29 | 21.000 | INTC | INTC fiscal year ended 2001-12-29 | 84.458 | 27.541 |
Reference 2006-07. CSUSHPINSA · monthly mean / revised. post-development asset-transfer illustration. Housing can decline slowly without crossing this rolling barrier; pre-launch index is a backfill.
First exposed: Homeowners lost equity; mortgage defaults passed losses to lenders and mortgage-security investors.
Transmission: Highly leveraged financial firms and securitized credit transmitted the shock beyond homeowners.
Public burden: Treasury put public funds at risk throughTARP. Its final net program cost was$31.1bn including interest, asof2023-09-30; this is NOT the total economic cost of the crisis or gross bank-loss subsidy.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 · Risk evidence 2 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2004-07 | -24.000 | 82.520 | 2004-06 | 0.340 | 0.000 | true |
| 2004-08 | -23.000 | 83.320 | 2004-07 | 0.341 | 0.000 | true |
| 2004-09 | -22.000 | 84.021 | 2004-08 | 0.342 | 0.000 | true |
| 2004-10 | -21.000 | 84.665 | 2004-09 | 0.343 | 0.000 | true |
| 2004-11 | -20.000 | 85.314 | 2004-10 | 0.342 | 0.000 | true |
| 2004-12 | -19.000 | 85.950 | 2004-11 | 0.341 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-01 | -18.000 | 86.741 | 2004-12 | 0.340 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-02 | -17.000 | 87.713 | 2005-01 | 0.338 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-03 | -16.000 | 89.150 | 2005-02 | 0.337 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-04 | -15.000 | 90.463 | 2005-03 | 0.334 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-05 | -14.000 | 91.842 | 2005-04 | 0.335 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-06 | -13.000 | 93.180 | 2005-05 | 0.335 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-07 | -12.000 | 94.308 | 2005-06 | 0.335 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-08 | -11.000 | 95.296 | 2005-07 | 0.336 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-09 | -10.000 | 96.211 | 2005-08 | 0.337 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-10 | -9.000 | 96.829 | 2005-09 | 0.337 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-11 | -8.000 | 97.329 | 2005-10 | 0.339 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-12 | -7.000 | 97.563 | 2005-11 | 0.342 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-01 | -6.000 | 97.953 | 2005-12 | 0.348 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-02 | -5.000 | 98.316 | 2006-01 | 0.350 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-03 | -4.000 | 98.994 | 2006-02 | 0.354 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-04 | -3.000 | 99.481 | 2006-03 | 0.354 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-05 | -2.000 | 99.877 | 2006-04 | 0.357 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-06 | -1.000 | 99.967 | 2006-05 | 0.359 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-07 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 2006-06 | 0.363 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-08 | 1.000 | 99.890 | 2006-07 | 0.367 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-09 | 2.000 | 99.778 | 2006-08 | 0.379 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-10 | 3.000 | 99.700 | 2006-09 | 0.390 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-11 | 4.000 | 99.471 | 2006-10 | 0.399 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-12 | 5.000 | 99.253 | 2006-11 | 0.421 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-01 | 6.000 | 98.976 | 2006-12 | 0.442 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-02 | 7.000 | 98.841 | 2007-01 | 0.471 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-03 | 8.000 | 98.691 | 2007-02 | 0.484 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-04 | 9.000 | 98.657 | 2007-03 | 0.498 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-05 | 10.000 | 98.524 | 2007-04 | 0.500 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-06 | 11.000 | 98.338 | 2007-05 | 0.512 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-07 | 12.000 | 98.042 | 2007-06 | 0.531 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-08 | 13.000 | 97.631 | 2007-07 | 0.553 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-09 | 14.000 | 97.028 | 2007-08 | 0.591 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-10 | 15.000 | 96.166 | 2007-09 | 0.663 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-11 | 16.000 | 94.883 | 2007-10 | 0.766 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-12 | 17.000 | 93.895 | 2007-11 | 0.975 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-01 | 18.000 | 92.670 | 2007-12 | 1.131 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-02 | 19.000 | 91.648 | 2008-01 | 1.428 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-03 | 20.000 | 90.950 | 2008-02 | 1.705 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-04 | 21.000 | 90.634 | 2008-03 | 1.936 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-05 | 22.000 | 90.469 | 2008-04 | 1.996 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-06 | 23.000 | 90.208 | 2008-05 | 1.988 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-07 | 24.000 | 89.764 | 2008-06 | 1.986 | 0.000 | true |
No verified P/E. unavailable. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
No observations acquired.
No observations acquired.
Reference 2007-10. SPASTT01CNM661N · monthly mean / revised. post-development asset-transfer illustration.
First exposed: Investors holding Chinese equities bore the market-value decline.
Transmission: No case-specific split among retail, institutions and creditors was verified here.
Public burden: No quantified tax-funded loss allocation established in this dataset.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 · Risk evidence 2 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-10 | -24.000 | 19.695 | 2005-09 | 8.010 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-11 | -23.000 | 19.105 | 2005-10 | 14.157 | 0.000 | true |
| 2005-12 | -22.000 | 19.522 | 2005-11 | 14.200 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-01 | -21.000 | 21.253 | 2005-12 | 6.545 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-02 | -20.000 | 22.213 | 2006-01 | 1.286 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-03 | -19.000 | 22.232 | 2006-02 | 0.651 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-04 | -18.000 | 23.844 | 2006-03 | 0.680 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-05 | -17.000 | 27.226 | 2006-04 | 0.560 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-06 | -16.000 | 27.931 | 2006-05 | 0.427 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-07 | -15.000 | 29.266 | 2006-06 | 0.469 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-08 | -14.000 | 27.877 | 2006-07 | 0.397 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-09 | -13.000 | 29.527 | 2006-08 | 1.344 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-10 | -12.000 | 30.929 | 2006-09 | 0.450 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-11 | -11.000 | 33.929 | 2006-10 | 0.399 | 0.000 | true |
| 2006-12 | -10.000 | 40.012 | 2006-11 | 0.321 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-01 | -9.000 | 48.573 | 2006-12 | 0.282 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-02 | -8.000 | 49.568 | 2007-01 | 0.279 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-03 | -7.000 | 51.873 | 2007-02 | 0.375 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-04 | -6.000 | 61.355 | 2007-03 | 0.336 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-05 | -5.000 | 69.918 | 2007-04 | 0.271 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-06 | -4.000 | 69.603 | 2007-05 | 0.287 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-07 | -3.000 | 69.662 | 2007-06 | 0.407 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-08 | -2.000 | 84.106 | 2007-07 | 0.427 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-09 | -1.000 | 92.976 | 2007-08 | 0.231 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-10 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 2007-09 | 0.251 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-11 | 1.000 | 91.337 | 2007-10 | 0.252 | 0.000 | true |
| 2007-12 | 2.000 | 88.095 | 2007-11 | 2.480 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-01 | 3.000 | 87.689 | 2007-12 | 5.153 | 0.000 | true |
| 2008-02 | 4.000 | 77.843 | 2008-01 | 5.841 | 1.000 | true |
| 2008-03 | 5.000 | 67.915 | 2008-02 | — | — | false |
| 2008-04 | 6.000 | 58.968 | 2008-03 | — | — | false |
| 2008-05 | 7.000 | 61.831 | 2008-04 | — | — | false |
| 2008-06 | 8.000 | 52.240 | 2008-05 | — | — | false |
| 2008-07 | 9.000 | 48.606 | 2008-06 | — | — | false |
| 2008-08 | 10.000 | 43.304 | 2008-07 | — | — | false |
| 2008-09 | 11.000 | 37.676 | 2008-08 | — | — | false |
| 2008-10 | 12.000 | 34.358 | 2008-09 | — | — | false |
| 2008-11 | 13.000 | 32.541 | 2008-10 | — | — | false |
| 2008-12 | 14.000 | 33.840 | 2008-11 | — | — | false |
| 2009-01 | 15.000 | 33.626 | 2008-12 | — | — | false |
| 2009-02 | 16.000 | 38.251 | 2009-01 | — | — | false |
| 2009-03 | 17.000 | 38.651 | 2009-02 | — | — | false |
| 2009-04 | 18.000 | 42.670 | 2009-03 | — | — | false |
| 2009-05 | 19.000 | 45.309 | 2009-04 | — | — | false |
| 2009-06 | 20.000 | 49.096 | 2009-05 | 15.288 | 0.000 | true |
| 2009-07 | 21.000 | 55.679 | 2009-06 | 0.962 | 0.000 | true |
| 2009-08 | 22.000 | 53.347 | 2009-07 | 0.787 | 0.000 | true |
| 2009-09 | 23.000 | 50.113 | 2009-08 | 1.955 | 0.000 | true |
| 2009-10 | 24.000 | 51.105 | 2009-09 | 4.987 | 0.000 | true |
Shanghai Stock Exchange total market. year-end. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
| date | offset | pe | cape |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-12 | -22.000 | 16.330 | — |
| 2006-12 | -10.000 | 33.300 | — |
| 2007-12 | 2.000 | 59.240 | — |
No observations acquired.
Reference 2015-06. SPASTT01CNM661N · monthly mean / revised. post-development asset-transfer illustration.
First exposed: Equity investors, especially leveraged retail accounts forced to sell as they approached borrowing limits.
Transmission: Brokerage and shadow-financed margin systems transmitted forced selling. Small investors and large investors had different outcomes; aggregate loss is not uniform.
Public burden: Authorities supported markets; do not equate support commitments with realized taxpayer loss.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 · Risk evidence 2 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-06 | -24.000 | 44.589 | 2013-05 | 1.783 | 0.000 | true |
| 2013-07 | -23.000 | 42.096 | 2013-06 | 5.606 | 0.000 | true |
| 2013-08 | -22.000 | 43.354 | 2013-07 | 13.674 | 0.000 | true |
| 2013-09 | -21.000 | 45.698 | 2013-08 | 7.538 | 0.000 | true |
| 2013-10 | -20.000 | 45.659 | 2013-09 | 2.937 | 0.000 | true |
| 2013-11 | -19.000 | 45.196 | 2013-10 | 3.263 | 0.000 | true |
| 2013-12 | -18.000 | 45.226 | 2013-11 | 3.847 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-01 | -17.000 | 42.638 | 2013-12 | 3.824 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-02 | -16.000 | 43.479 | 2014-01 | 11.391 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-03 | -15.000 | 42.576 | 2014-02 | 3.878 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-04 | -14.000 | 43.351 | 2014-03 | 4.368 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-05 | -13.000 | 42.426 | 2014-04 | 2.873 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-06 | -12.000 | 42.706 | 2014-05 | 2.546 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-07 | -11.000 | 43.613 | 2014-06 | 1.973 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-08 | -10.000 | 46.375 | 2014-07 | 1.173 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-09 | -9.000 | 48.448 | 2014-08 | 0.464 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-10 | -8.000 | 49.266 | 2014-09 | 0.475 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-11 | -7.000 | 52.122 | 2014-10 | 0.487 | 0.000 | true |
| 2014-12 | -6.000 | 62.601 | 2014-11 | 0.444 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-01 | -5.000 | 68.747 | 2014-12 | 0.412 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-02 | -4.000 | 66.931 | 2015-01 | 0.391 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-03 | -3.000 | 72.833 | 2015-02 | 0.844 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-04 | -2.000 | 87.208 | 2015-03 | 0.382 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-05 | -1.000 | 93.375 | 2015-04 | 0.322 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-06 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 2015-05 | 0.332 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-07 | 1.000 | 80.449 | 2015-06 | 0.303 | 0.000 | true |
| 2015-08 | 2.000 | 75.134 | 2015-07 | 29.691 | 1.000 | true |
| 2015-09 | 3.000 | 65.453 | 2015-08 | — | — | false |
| 2015-10 | 4.000 | 68.499 | 2015-09 | — | — | false |
| 2015-11 | 5.000 | 74.448 | 2015-10 | — | — | false |
| 2015-12 | 6.000 | 74.131 | 2015-11 | — | — | false |
| 2016-01 | 7.000 | 62.921 | 2015-12 | — | — | false |
| 2016-02 | 8.000 | 58.404 | 2016-01 | — | — | false |
| 2016-03 | 9.000 | 60.805 | 2016-02 | — | — | false |
| 2016-04 | 10.000 | 62.826 | 2016-03 | — | — | false |
| 2016-05 | 11.000 | 59.861 | 2016-04 | — | — | false |
| 2016-06 | 12.000 | 60.661 | 2016-05 | — | — | false |
| 2016-07 | 13.000 | 63.069 | 2016-06 | — | — | false |
| 2016-08 | 14.000 | 63.761 | 2016-07 | 19.671 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-09 | 15.000 | 63.414 | 2016-08 | 14.395 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-10 | 16.000 | 64.109 | 2016-09 | 12.849 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-11 | 17.000 | 66.803 | 2016-10 | 10.859 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-12 | 18.000 | 65.974 | 2016-11 | 5.036 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-01 | 19.000 | 65.600 | 2016-12 | 1.070 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-02 | 20.000 | 67.027 | 2017-01 | 0.773 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-03 | 21.000 | 67.747 | 2017-02 | 0.430 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-04 | 22.000 | 67.193 | 2017-03 | 0.441 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-05 | 23.000 | 64.776 | 2017-04 | 0.548 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-06 | 24.000 | 65.763 | 2017-05 | 1.097 | 0.000 | true |
Shanghai Stock Exchange total market. year-end. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
| date | offset | pe | cape |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-12 | -18.000 | 10.990 | — |
| 2014-12 | -6.000 | 15.990 | — |
| 2015-12 | 6.000 | 17.630 | — |
No observations acquired.
Reference 2017-12. BTC · monthly mean / revised. post-development asset-transfer illustration.
First exposed: Long Bitcoin holders; pessimistic futures traders could gain as prices fell.
Transmission: Investor entry timing and position direction determine losses. No complete2017creditor or customer allocation verified.
Public burden: No public loss allocation established here.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-12 | -24.000 | 2.793 | 2015-11 | 1.563 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-01 | -23.000 | 2.705 | 2015-12 | 1.504 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-02 | -22.000 | 2.655 | 2016-01 | 2.008 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-03 | -21.000 | 2.730 | 2016-02 | 2.594 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-04 | -20.000 | 2.866 | 2016-03 | 1.544 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-05 | -19.000 | 3.047 | 2016-04 | 0.716 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-06 | -18.000 | 4.233 | 2016-05 | 0.660 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-07 | -17.000 | 4.361 | 2016-06 | 0.421 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-08 | -16.000 | 3.812 | 2016-07 | 0.734 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-09 | -15.000 | 3.990 | 2016-08 | 10.460 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-10 | -14.000 | 4.230 | 2016-09 | 3.215 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-11 | -13.000 | 4.774 | 2016-10 | 1.173 | 0.000 | true |
| 2016-12 | -12.000 | 5.432 | 2016-11 | 0.586 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-01 | -11.000 | 6.008 | 2016-12 | 0.579 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-02 | -10.000 | 7.020 | 2017-01 | 0.516 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-03 | -9.000 | 7.431 | 2017-02 | 0.399 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-04 | -8.000 | 8.030 | 2017-03 | 0.446 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-05 | -7.000 | 12.424 | 2017-04 | 0.418 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-06 | -6.000 | 17.219 | 2017-05 | 0.269 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-07 | -5.000 | 16.514 | 2017-06 | 0.317 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-08 | -4.000 | 25.501 | 2017-07 | 1.377 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-09 | -3.000 | 27.000 | 2017-08 | 0.190 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-10 | -2.000 | 35.200 | 2017-09 | 0.329 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-11 | -1.000 | 51.211 | 2017-10 | 0.196 | 0.000 | true |
| 2017-12 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 2017-11 | 0.145 | 0.000 | true |
| 2018-01 | 1.000 | 84.843 | 2017-12 | 0.095 | 0.000 | true |
| 2018-02 | 2.000 | 61.844 | 2018-01 | 10.153 | 1.000 | true |
| 2018-03 | 3.000 | 59.181 | 2018-02 | — | — | false |
| 2018-04 | 4.000 | 52.771 | 2018-03 | — | — | false |
| 2018-05 | 5.000 | 55.438 | 2018-04 | — | — | false |
| 2018-06 | 6.000 | 44.552 | 2018-05 | — | — | false |
| 2018-07 | 7.000 | 46.852 | 2018-06 | — | — | false |
| 2018-08 | 8.000 | 43.949 | 2018-07 | — | — | false |
| 2018-09 | 9.000 | 43.373 | 2018-08 | — | — | false |
| 2018-10 | 10.000 | 42.221 | 2018-09 | — | — | false |
| 2018-11 | 11.000 | 35.183 | 2018-10 | — | — | false |
| 2018-12 | 12.000 | 24.126 | 2018-11 | — | — | false |
| 2019-01 | 13.000 | 24.083 | 2018-12 | — | — | false |
| 2019-02 | 14.000 | 24.083 | 2019-01 | — | — | false |
| 2019-03 | 15.000 | 25.822 | 2019-02 | — | — | false |
| 2019-04 | 16.000 | 33.867 | 2019-03 | — | — | false |
| 2019-05 | 17.000 | 47.998 | 2019-04 | — | — | false |
| 2019-06 | 18.000 | 61.820 | 2019-05 | 2.347 | 0.000 | true |
| 2019-07 | 19.000 | 70.156 | 2019-06 | 1.789 | 0.000 | true |
| 2019-08 | 20.000 | 69.953 | 2019-07 | 2.057 | 0.000 | true |
| 2019-09 | 21.000 | 64.449 | 2019-08 | 2.434 | 0.000 | true |
| 2019-10 | 22.000 | 55.200 | 2019-09 | 12.422 | 1.000 | true |
| 2019-11 | 23.000 | 54.888 | 2019-10 | — | — | false |
| 2019-12 | 24.000 | 47.691 | 2019-11 | — | — | false |
No verified P/E. unavailable. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
No observations acquired.
No observations acquired.
Reference 2021-11. BTC · monthly mean / revised. post-development asset-transfer illustration.
First exposed: Bitcoin holders; BIS estimates most crypto-app users in its2015–22sample lost on Bitcoin.
Transmission: The2022crypto shock also exposed exchange/lending customers; price losses and platform failures are separate channels.
Public burden: BIS found limited discernible spillovers outside crypto in these shocks. This is not a claim of zero external risk.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-11 | -24.000 | 13.743 | 2019-10 | — | — | false |
| 2019-12 | -23.000 | 11.941 | 2019-11 | — | — | false |
| 2020-01 | -22.000 | 13.786 | 2019-12 | — | — | false |
| 2020-02 | -21.000 | 15.896 | 2020-01 | — | — | false |
| 2020-03 | -20.000 | 11.346 | 2020-02 | 4.689 | 1.000 | true |
| 2020-04 | -19.000 | 11.905 | 2020-03 | — | — | false |
| 2020-05 | -18.000 | 15.267 | 2020-04 | — | — | false |
| 2020-06 | -17.000 | 15.620 | 2020-05 | 16.361 | 0.000 | true |
| 2020-07 | -16.000 | 15.815 | 2020-06 | 16.222 | 0.000 | true |
| 2020-08 | -15.000 | 19.195 | 2020-07 | 13.711 | 0.000 | true |
| 2020-09 | -14.000 | 17.545 | 2020-08 | 1.690 | 0.000 | true |
| 2020-10 | -13.000 | 19.602 | 2020-09 | 12.417 | 0.000 | true |
| 2020-11 | -12.000 | 27.471 | 2020-10 | 1.414 | 0.000 | true |
| 2020-12 | -11.000 | 36.246 | 2020-11 | 0.938 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-01 | -10.000 | 57.268 | 2020-12 | 0.683 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-02 | -9.000 | 76.323 | 2021-01 | 0.534 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-03 | -8.000 | 90.523 | 2021-02 | 0.642 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-04 | -7.000 | 94.102 | 2021-03 | 0.246 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-05 | -6.000 | 76.638 | 2021-04 | 0.305 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-06 | -5.000 | 59.013 | 2021-05 | 26.251 | 1.000 | true |
| 2021-07 | -4.000 | 56.707 | 2021-06 | — | — | false |
| 2021-08 | -3.000 | 75.385 | 2021-07 | — | — | false |
| 2021-09 | -2.000 | 75.682 | 2021-08 | 29.861 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-10 | -1.000 | 95.437 | 2021-09 | 34.335 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-11 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 2021-10 | 0.751 | 0.000 | true |
| 2021-12 | 1.000 | 81.334 | 2021-11 | 1.180 | 0.000 | true |
| 2022-01 | 2.000 | 67.749 | 2021-12 | 53.894 | 1.000 | true |
| 2022-02 | 3.000 | 67.161 | 2022-01 | — | — | false |
| 2022-03 | 4.000 | 69.167 | 2022-02 | — | — | false |
| 2022-04 | 5.000 | 68.290 | 2022-03 | — | — | false |
| 2022-05 | 6.000 | 52.249 | 2022-04 | — | — | false |
| 2022-06 | 7.000 | 40.130 | 2022-05 | — | — | false |
| 2022-07 | 8.000 | 35.504 | 2022-06 | — | — | false |
| 2022-08 | 9.000 | 36.850 | 2022-07 | — | — | false |
| 2022-09 | 10.000 | 32.616 | 2022-08 | — | — | false |
| 2022-10 | 11.000 | 32.377 | 2022-09 | — | — | false |
| 2022-11 | 12.000 | 28.969 | 2022-10 | — | — | false |
| 2022-12 | 13.000 | 27.910 | 2022-11 | — | — | false |
| 2023-01 | 14.000 | 33.353 | 2022-12 | — | — | false |
| 2023-02 | 15.000 | 38.401 | 2023-01 | — | — | false |
| 2023-03 | 16.000 | 41.400 | 2023-02 | — | — | false |
| 2023-04 | 17.000 | 47.550 | 2023-03 | — | — | false |
| 2023-05 | 18.000 | 45.343 | 2023-04 | 12.095 | 0.000 | true |
| 2023-06 | 19.000 | 45.746 | 2023-05 | 4.859 | 0.000 | true |
| 2023-07 | 20.000 | 49.519 | 2023-06 | 2.222 | 0.000 | true |
| 2023-08 | 21.000 | 45.885 | 2023-07 | 0.738 | 0.000 | true |
| 2023-09 | 22.000 | 43.349 | 2023-08 | 4.375 | 0.000 | true |
| 2023-10 | 23.000 | 49.022 | 2023-09 | 9.481 | 0.000 | true |
| 2023-11 | 24.000 | 60.320 | 2023-10 | 0.787 | 0.000 | true |
No verified P/E. unavailable. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
No observations acquired.
No observations acquired.
Reference 2026-08. Nasdaq month-end close. uncalibrated Nasdaq transfer.
First exposed: Scenario: public hyperscaler/supplier shareholders and private lab investors first face reduced equity value or dilution.
Transmission: Scenario: creditors and equipment/data-center lessors face default or stranded-capacity exposure; compute providers face customer-concentration and contracted-capacity risk.
Public burden: No observed AI crash or public rescue is assumed. Customer and taxpayer burden depends on contracts and future policy, so leave unquantified.
Price / historical source · Risk evidence 1 · Risk evidence 2 · Risk evidence 3 · Risk evidence 4 ·
| month | from reference | price reference 100 | forecast made | forecast pct | observed crossing | eligible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-08 | -24.000 | 67.171 | 2024-07 | 0.642 | 0.000 | true |
| 2024-09 | -23.000 | 68.974 | 2024-08 | 0.533 | 0.000 | true |
| 2024-10 | -22.000 | 68.618 | 2024-09 | 0.432 | 0.000 | true |
| 2024-11 | -21.000 | 72.876 | 2024-10 | 0.478 | 0.000 | true |
| 2024-12 | -20.000 | 73.228 | 2024-11 | 0.383 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-01 | -19.000 | 74.428 | 2024-12 | 0.433 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-02 | -18.000 | 71.470 | 2025-01 | 0.422 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-03 | -17.000 | 65.600 | 2025-02 | 1.112 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-04 | -16.000 | 66.158 | 2025-03 | 6.423 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-05 | -15.000 | 72.481 | 2025-04 | 4.528 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-06 | -14.000 | 77.243 | 2025-05 | 0.810 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-07 | -13.000 | 80.098 | 2025-06 | 0.510 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-08 | -12.000 | 81.361 | 2025-07 | 0.510 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-09 | -11.000 | 85.928 | 2025-08 | 0.522 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-10 | -10.000 | 89.966 | 2025-09 | 0.486 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-11 | -9.000 | 88.604 | 2025-10 | 0.469 | 0.000 | true |
| 2025-12 | -8.000 | 88.135 | 2025-11 | 0.736 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-01 | -7.000 | 88.969 | 2025-12 | 0.812 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-02 | -6.000 | 85.959 | 2026-01 | 0.669 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-03 | -5.000 | 81.873 | 2026-02 | 1.342 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-04 | -4.000 | 94.393 | 2026-03 | 2.929 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-05 | -3.000 | 102.282 | 2026-04 | 0.401 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-06 | -2.000 | 99.404 | 2026-05 | 0.439 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-07 | -1.000 | 96.219 | 2026-06 | 0.984 | 0.000 | true |
| 2026-08 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 2026-07 | 1.955 | 0.000 | true |
US broad market context; not AI-specific. monthly; source earnings interpolated. Shiller earnings are interpolated in the source. Fiscal investment series are selected survivor firms and not the full dot-com or telecom sector.
| date | offset | pe | cape |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-08 | -24.000 | 27.515 | 34.920 |
| 2024-09 | -23.000 | 28.068 | 35.660 |
| 2024-10 | -22.000 | 28.454 | 36.587 |
| 2024-11 | -21.000 | 28.665 | 37.350 |
| 2024-12 | -20.000 | 28.600 | 37.711 |
| 2025-01 | -19.000 | 28.160 | 37.129 |
| 2025-02 | -18.000 | 28.150 | 37.187 |
| 2025-03 | -17.000 | 26.231 | 34.785 |
| 2025-04 | -16.000 | 24.559 | 32.621 |
| 2025-05 | -15.000 | 26.343 | 35.077 |
| 2025-06 | -14.000 | 27.097 | 36.111 |
| 2025-07 | -13.000 | 27.766 | 37.474 |
| 2025-08 | -12.000 | 27.743 | 37.846 |
| 2025-09 | -11.000 | 27.987 | 38.580 |
| 2025-10 | -10.000 | 28.415 | 39.206 |
| 2025-11 | -9.000 | 28.224 | 39.150 |
| 2025-12 | -8.000 | 28.479 | 39.582 |
| 2026-01 | -7.000 | 27.978 | 39.641 |
| 2026-02 | -6.000 | 27.067 | 39.014 |
| 2026-03 | -5.000 | 25.425 | 37.032 |
| 2026-04 | -4.000 | 25.489 | 38.138 |
| 2026-05 | -3.000 | 26.085 | 40.101 |
| 2026-06 | -2.000 | 25.221 | 40.150 |
| 2026-07 | -1.000 | — | 40.009 |
| 2026-08 | 0.000 | — | 41.120 |
No observations acquired.
Download chart data, formula, validation and provenance (JSON) · Latest dated Nasdaq model estimate (JSON) · Previous exuberance benchmark (JSON) · SEC accounts export
Railroad sources: Macaulay (1938), NBER Macrohistory series 11005 and 13019. Nasdaq: FRED NASDAQCOM. Industry portfolios: Kenneth French Data Library. US P/E and CAPE: Robert Shiller data. Japanese P/E: French & Poterba, Table 4; 1989 reported P/E 53.7 versus accounting-adjusted 32.6. SSE observations are annual endpoints, including December 2015 after the crash.
| case | date | pe | proxy | note | source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| japan1989 | 1970-12 | 9.000 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1971-12 | 13.500 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1972-12 | 23.300 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1973-12 | 13.900 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1974-12 | 16.500 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1975-12 | 25.200 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1976-12 | 22.000 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1977-12 | 19.300 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1978-12 | 21.500 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1979-12 | 16.600 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1980-12 | 17.900 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1981-12 | 24.900 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1982-12 | 23.700 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1983-12 | 29.400 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1984-12 | 26.300 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1985-12 | 29.400 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1986-12 | 58.600 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1987-12 | 50.400 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1988-12 | 54.300 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1989-12 | 53.700 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| japan1989 | 1990-08 | 36.600 | NRI 350 Japanese nonfinancial firms | Not Nikkei225. Unconsolidated Japanese earnings; not accounting-harmonized US PE. Paper estimates1989adjustedPE32.6 vs reported53.7. | https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/1-s2.0-0304405X91900066-main.pdf |
| china2007 | 2005-12 | 16.330 | Shanghai Stock Exchange total market | Different universe from OECD China price proxy. Year-end observation is NOT crash-peak PE; do not interpolate to monthly. 2015total includesA+B; A-share-onlyPE17.61. | https://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/10061086/files/c6db3f91030b4533ad5bd85cb421b18e.pdf |
| china2007 | 2006-12 | 33.300 | Shanghai Stock Exchange total market | Different universe from OECD China price proxy. Year-end observation is NOT crash-peak PE; do not interpolate to monthly. 2015total includesA+B; A-share-onlyPE17.61. | https://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/10061086/files/c6db3f91030b4533ad5bd85cb421b18e.pdf |
| china2007 | 2007-12 | 59.240 | Shanghai Stock Exchange total market | Different universe from OECD China price proxy. Year-end observation is NOT crash-peak PE; do not interpolate to monthly. 2015total includesA+B; A-share-onlyPE17.61. | https://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/10061086/files/c6db3f91030b4533ad5bd85cb421b18e.pdf |
| china2015 | 2013-12 | 10.990 | Shanghai Stock Exchange total market | Different universe from OECD China price proxy. Year-end observation is NOT crash-peak PE; do not interpolate to monthly. 2015total includesA+B; A-share-onlyPE17.61. | https://star.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/10061078/files/08c138fe02fa460aa1c217eaf20b2b69.pdf |
| china2015 | 2014-12 | 15.990 | Shanghai Stock Exchange total market | Different universe from OECD China price proxy. Year-end observation is NOT crash-peak PE; do not interpolate to monthly. 2015total includesA+B; A-share-onlyPE17.61. | https://star.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/10061078/files/08c138fe02fa460aa1c217eaf20b2b69.pdf |
| china2015 | 2015-12 | 17.630 | Shanghai Stock Exchange total market | Different universe from OECD China price proxy. Year-end observation is NOT crash-peak PE; do not interpolate to monthly. 2015total includesA+B; A-share-onlyPE17.61. | https://star.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/10061078/files/08c138fe02fa460aa1c217eaf20b2b69.pdf |
Capex / OCF 13.28% · Capex / revenue 5.70%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 34.59% · Capex / revenue 14.51%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 10.64% · Capex / revenue 4.39%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 44.97% · Capex / revenue 17.95%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 9.53% · Capex / revenue 4.53%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 38.70% · Capex / revenue 13.54%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 5.81% · Capex / revenue 2.95%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 30.02% · Capex / revenue 11.58%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 6.30% · Capex / revenue 3.83%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 52.03% · Capex / revenue 19.79%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 8.22% · Capex / revenue 4.36%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 84.46% · Capex / revenue 27.54%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 5.31% · Capex / revenue 2.71%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 51.52% · Capex / revenue 17.57%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 5.64% · Capex / revenue 2.77%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Item 8, Income Statements and Cash Flows Statements, fiscal-year columns
Capex / OCF 31.75% · Capex / revenue 12.13%. MSFT + INTC survivor sample; not all dotcom firms or telecom buildout. Publication date unverified.
Capex / OCF 63.38% · Capex / revenue 34.94%. Company-wide operations, not AI-specific. Cash capex excludes noncash leases. Different fiscal endpoints.
Capex / OCF 71.31% · Capex / revenue 29.70%. Company-wide operations, not AI-specific. Cash capex excludes noncash leases. Different fiscal endpoints.
Capex / OCF 68.55% · Capex / revenue 39.14%. Company-wide operations, not AI-specific. Cash capex excludes noncash leases. Different fiscal endpoints.
Capex / OCF 107.20% · Capex / revenue 22.31%. Company-wide operations, not AI-specific. Cash capex excludes noncash leases. Different fiscal endpoints.
Capex / OCF 174.07% · Capex / revenue 82.64%. Company-wide operations, not AI-specific. Cash capex excludes noncash leases. Different fiscal endpoints.
OpenAI · 2026-03-31: 35.5x revenue pace; not EV/revenue or audited annual sales. Uses same-date primary disclosure, not newer media estimate.
Anthropic · 2026-05-28: Less than 20.532x because revenue run rate exceeds $47bn. Not P/E, EV/revenue, or annual GAAP sales. Same-date primary disclosure, not newer media estimate.
These are private equity valuation / annualized revenue pace, not public P/E, enterprise value / revenue, or audited annual sales. No numeric loss allocation or probability effect is inferred from them.
The earlier detailed dashboard is preserved below, including individual company accounts, OpenAI, Anthropic, SpaceX/xAI, Nvidia, interest rates, energy assumptions and the retired hand-weighted score. The compact dashboard above uses distinct measures, not that retired aggregate score.
Evidence reviewed September 7, 2026. These are dated editorial observations, not a live revenue feed.
Epoch AI, August 27, 2026 reports OpenAI above $40B annualized revenue and Anthropic around $65B by the end of July. Run rates extrapolate recent sales; they are not earned full-year revenue, recurring subscription ARR or profit. Partner-channel accounting differs: Anthropic books gross customer charges while OpenAI books its net share. The roughly $105B sum is therefore not a comparable, deduplicated market total. We show the firms separately.
Exponential View, June 25, 2026 estimates $110B trailing-year end-customer sales and more than $175B annualized across generative AI. Its model removes transactions within the supply chain; it excludes internal business uplift, efficiency savings, professional services and China. This is an analyst estimate, not audited sector accounts.
Epoch’s argument is that unusually persistent revenue growth is evidence of useful demand. The question is whether new capabilities sustain growth or adoption saturates. Exponential View compares attributable revenue with depreciation using six-year compute and fourteen-year other-infrastructure lives. Clearing depreciation alone does not cover operating costs, financing costs or required investor returns. Neither argument establishes fair value.
IMF, October 2025 warned that stretched valuations and concentrated exposure could amplify corrections if earnings disappoint. BIS, January 2026 emphasized the shift from internal cash toward debt financing. Together these challenge the inference that rapid sales growth alone makes the buildout safe: compare durable cash margins, debt service and funding terms with the revenue trajectory. These are analytical warnings, not calibrated crash forecasts.
Nvidia, August 10, 2026: memorandums with Apollo, BlackRock, Blackstone, Brookfield, Goldman Sachs and KKR target over $500B of third-party infrastructure capital over time, subject to final agreements. This is not $500B of Nvidia sales, deployed capital or a single funded bank loan. Watch actual underwriting, guarantees, utilization and collateral values.
Alphabet Q2 2026 filing: $49.6B net proceeds from common and mandatory convertible preferred stock issued in June; separately, a $40B at-the-market program had sold no shares at June 30 and was primarily intended for employee-equity tax obligations. The earlier $80B proposal and these subsequent proceeds must not be added together. Issuance brings cash and can dilute shareholders; it is not customer revenue.
Simple undiscounted recovery time = acquisition price / annual distributable cash, or price-to-sales multiple / cash margin. It assumes constant revenue and margin, with reinvestment included in the margin. It excludes growth, discounting and residual value and is not a valuation model. We do not divide global hyperscaler capex by lab revenue: the entities, assets, timing and revenue boundaries do not match.
Historical lesson: railway and dot-com infrastructure could gain users while investors lost money. Compare demand growth with margins, reinvestment and financing obligations—not demand growth alone. Comparable historical customer-revenue and capital cohorts remain a research gap.
Microsoft + Intel, fiscal 1996–2003. Two surviving companies, not the dot-com sector or failed telecom builders. Each bar is capital spending per operating-cash dollar.
Common scale: 0–100¢ per $1 of operating cash. Click a fiscal year for the actual accounts. The chart does not align observations to a retrospectively selected stock-market peak.
Fiscal endpoints: Microsoft 2000-06-30; Intel 2000-12-30. Annual windows differ and include information reported after the market peak. Company accounts & provenance ↗
The stress in 2001: spending still rose 11%, while operating cash fell 18% and revenue fell 9%. More of each cash dollar went into investment.
Today’s five builders: 83¢ per $1 cash; spending changed 84%, operating cash 37%, revenue 19%.
What transfers: falling cash generation alongside committed spending can squeeze funding. The different company mix and infrastructure intensity prevent treating 38¢ then as a crash threshold for 82¢ today.
Annual gross revenue per £100 of accumulated construction cost. A matched historical industry measure—not profit, P/E or annual capex coverage.
Common bar scale: £0–£12 annual revenue per £100 construction cost. Annual observations; no interpolated months.
Revenue intensity fell from £9.9 in 1845 to £5.9 in 1850, while route mileage expanded. Growing infrastructure and disappointing financial returns can coexist. AI needs its own matched asset-cost and revenue data before this ratio can be compared numerically.
| Year | Miles | Construction £/mile | Annual revenue £/mile |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1844 | 2240 | 35700 | 3280 |
| 1845 | 2536 | 35000 | 3470 |
| 1846 | 3142 | 31800 | 3300 |
| 1847 | 3945 | 31700 | 2870 |
| 1848 | 5127 | 34200 | 2560 |
| 1849 | 5996 | 35200 | 2100 |
| 1850 | 6621 | 35200 | 2080 |
| 1851 | 6890 | 35100 | 2220 |
Odlyzko (2011), Table 1, page 8 ↗, compiled from Tooke/Newmarch (1857). Historical estimates vary by source. This British case is separate from US railroads in 1873; old and new lines are pooled.
At the 2006 peak, home prices were 34% higher relative to rents than in early 2000. This measures the price of housing against its rental-service counterpart, rather than showing prices alone.
100 means the price/rent relationship in 2000 Q1, not fair value or 100 years’ rent. Quarterly source observations; no monthly interpolation. The workbook maximum is Q1 2006; the article’s event-window reference is Q3 2006. Neither defines the onset of the later financial crisis.
AI parallel: compare asset prices with the cash-generating activity behind them. Earnings or rents may catch up, or prices may fall; a stretched ratio alone does not tell us which, or when.
Dallas Fed, February 2025 ↗ · Published chart workbook ↗. Historical vintage, retrieved September 7, 2026. Rebased from the publisher’s house and rent indexes; ratio reconciled against its separately published ratio sheet. Not an individual-property rental yield.
Annual fiscal accounts, two-company survivor sample. Fiscal labels do not synchronize calendar windows. Figures are retrospective reconstructions, not a point-in-time prediction test. Pooled ratio is total cash capex divided by total operating cash, never an average of company ratios.
| Company / fiscal end | Capex | Operating cash | Revenue | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSFT · 1996-06-30 | $0.5B | $3.7B | $8.7B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| INTC · 1996-12-28 | $3.0B | $8.7B | $20.8B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| MSFT · 1997-06-30 | $0.5B | $4.7B | $11.4B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| INTC · 1997-12-27 | $4.5B | $10.0B | $25.1B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| MSFT · 1998-06-30 | $0.7B | $6.9B | $14.5B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| INTC · 1998-12-26 | $3.6B | $9.2B | $26.3B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| MSFT · 1999-06-30 | $0.6B | $10.0B | $19.7B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| INTC · 1999-12-25 | $3.4B | $11.3B | $29.4B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| MSFT · 2000-06-30 | $0.9B | $14.0B | $23.0B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| INTC · 2000-12-30 | $6.7B | $12.8B | $33.7B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| MSFT · 2001-06-30 | $1.1B | $13.4B | $25.3B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| INTC · 2001-12-29 | $7.3B | $8.7B | $26.5B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| MSFT · 2002-06-30 | $0.8B | $14.5B | $28.4B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| INTC · 2002-12-28 | $4.7B | $9.1B | $26.8B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
| MSFT · 2003-06-30 | $0.9B | $15.8B | $32.2B | Income ↗ |
| INTC · 2003-12-27 | $3.7B | $11.5B | $30.1B | Income ↗ Cash flows ↗ |
These companies omit bankruptcies and many capital-intensive telecom firms. The comparison illustrates cash pressure, not historical crash detection accuracy. Revenue and operating cash have different accounting meanings; neither is a direct measure of customer economic benefit.
Supplier sales confirm the buildout is happening. They do not prove the eventual AI customer earns a return. Do not add these sales to lab or cloud revenue.
$40.2B quarterly sales, up 33.7% in USD year over year (Q2 2026). Advanced nodes made up 77% of wafer revenue.
Recognized foundry sales across AI and non-AI applications. Watch whether capacity and customer orders keep pace with downstream usage.
Quarterly report ↗€9.3B quarterly sales (Q2 2026). Management plans roughly 30% more low-NA EUV and immersion DUV capacity in 2027.
Sales are observed; capacity is a plan. More equipment capacity can ease bottlenecks while increasing overcapacity risk.
Results & capacity plan ↗$13.8B cloud-memory sales, versus $3.4B a year earlier (fiscal Q3, ended May 2026).
Broader than AI or high-bandwidth memory. Price increases and product mix can drive revenue; this is not a measure of physical demand alone.
Quarterly results ↗Stock Analysis snapshots use September 4 regular-session closes and provider trailing EPS. Seven displayed ratios reconcile within rounding. This is an arithmetic check, not a GAAP earnings audit. Forward P/E is omitted because its precise forecast horizon and accounting basis have not been verified.
TSMC and ASML multiples are excluded: their displayed price divided by EPS differs from quoted P/E. ADR, currency or provider conventions may matter; the cause is not established. A missing multiple is not zero or evidence of cheapness.
Share prices and earnings can both rise rapidly, leaving a moderate-looking trailing multiple. One year of unusually high earnings can also make a cyclical stock look inexpensive. Examine sustainable operating earnings and reinvestment alongside the multiple. An AI-only P/E requires separately valued AI operations and attributable earnings; those inputs are not available for this cohort.
Global builder trailing cash capex / Q2 2026 US nominal GDP at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. The dated denominator is $32,486.066B, released August 26. Geography, fiscal windows and value-added boundaries differ. It must not be called AI’s GDP share or growth contribution.
5M → >9M paying users
August 2025 to February 2026 disclosure snapshots. Purchased business access, not measured daily use.
15M → >30M paid seats
January to July 2026 earnings-call disclosures. Licensed seats, not active users; no comparable absolute 2025 baseline verified.
>480T → >3.2 quadrillion / month
May 2025 to May 2026 disclosures. Mixed paid, free and internal workloads; changing token mix prevents a constant-quality demand comparison.
Company-reported, irregular snapshots reviewed September 7, 2026. Do not sum overlapping populations or multiply seats/tokens by list prices to infer revenue. These measures do not establish retention, cash margins, paid GPU occupancy or infrastructure payback. Falling usage per paid seat or weaker renewals would weaken the demand thesis; sustained paid expansion with better margins would strengthen it.
FOLLOW THE MONEY. WATCH THE GAP.
Capital is moving fast. Are the returns keeping up?
A NEW MODEL / TESTED BEFORE INTERPRETATION
The original 65 measured spending pressure. This diagnostic asks a different question: are public-market prices following an unusually explosive path?
No persistent warning in the aggregate proxy.
Reference rank under an additive random-walk null. A value of 81.7 is not an 81.7% chance of a bubble or crash.
Frozen warning rule: percentile ≥95 for three consecutive months. Neither aggregate specification triggers now. This does not establish that AI assets are fairly valued.
Equal-weight, monthly-rebalanced French industry portfolios: electronic equipment, computers, and software. Total returns, including dividends; not an investable pure-AI index. This is not a direct price series for OpenAI, Anthropic, or SpaceX/xAI; AI exposure has not been verified constituent by constituent.
Source and portfolio definitions ↗Not yet a low-error bubble detector. Ten selected episodes are a small, partly dependent sample. Contrast periods are not certified non-bubbles. These counts cannot calibrate crash probabilities.
FUNDAMENTALS / AUTOMATIC SEC UPDATES
$586.4B cash capex ÷ $707.3B operating cash flow.
17.1% aggregate cash-flow cushion at fixed capex. This company-wide ratio can exceed 100%; it is not a bubble score, solvency measure, or AI-only return.
Original score retired after methodological audit ↗Cash capex / OCF · Unweighted, uncapped accounting ratio
THE LONGER VIEW
Filings available at each date · Fixed five-company cohort
Trailing 12 months
Company-wide totals
THE CURRENT READOUT
Cash capex grew 83.9% year over year. Revenue grew 18.7%.
TTM VS. PRIOR TTMOperating margin expanded 0.25 percentage points. That supports current operating earnings.
COMPANY-WIDE PROFITABILITYOracle spends 161.2% of operating cash on capex. The average hides the differences.
Calculated from the latest available filings. No new filing means no new fundamental signal.
FOLLOW THE BUILDERS
| COMPANY | PERIOD END | CASH CAPEX | OPERATING CASH FLOW | CAPEX / OCF | CASH-FLOW RESIDUAL | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 26 | $115.9B | $182.9B | 63.4% | $67.0B | ||
| Jun 26 | $132.4B | $185.7B | 71.3% | $53.3B | ||
| Jun 26 | $173.0B | $161.4B | 107.2% | $-11.6B | ||
| Jun 26 | $89.3B | $130.3B | 68.6% | $41.0B | ||
| Aug 26 | $75.7B | $46.9B | 161.2% | $-28.7B |
02 / FOLLOW THE MONEY
Who earns cash, who buys compute, and who ultimately carries the risk?
Frontier lab / compute buyer
Revenue pace
$2bn/monthMonthly pace reported March 2026; not audited annual revenue.
Frontier lab / compute buyer
Revenue pace
>$47bn run rateCompany-reported annualized pace, not GAAP annual sales.
Public parent / AI segment / compute provider
AI segment Q2 revenue
$2.561bnQ2 AI segment: Grok, X and infrastructure. $1.257B operating loss.
Supplier / financing exposure
Supplier TTM revenue
$303.0BTTM company-wide. 74.7% gross margin · $134.4B operating cash flow.
Different periods and definitions; these figures are not directly comparable or additive. Supplier sales, cloud spending, and lab revenue overlap along the value chain. Nvidia financials refresh from SEC; lab disclosures, segment details, and commitments are reviewed snapshots dated at source. Last editorial review: Sep 6, 2026.
Ben Thompson argues that Nvidia’s residual-value support shifts financing risk while protecting supplier margins. Track actual obligations, customer concentration, and cash collection alongside revenue. The $500B-plus mobilization target is preliminary; support of up to 25% applies to individual opportunities, not the entire target.
Read Thompson’s analysis · Aug 11, 2026Nvidia’s disclosed mechanism03 / THE COST OF CAPITAL & COMPUTE
Useful context, kept outside the score until their predictive contribution is tested.
Higher risk-free rates lower the present value of distant cash flows and raise the cost of new or refinanced debt. Credit spreads and debt terms determine what each borrower actually pays.
Sensitivity: +1 percentage point on $100B of new or repriced debt adds $1B in annual interest. An illustration, not a current interest bill.
Nominal and inflation-indexed constant-maturity yields. Falling Treasury yields during a recession can coexist with rising credit stress; lower rates do not automatically mean less bubble risk.
More power can unlock useful demand or enable excess capacity. Track the path from announced capacity to contracted, under construction, energized, and utilized capacity.
DOE / Berkeley Lab, published Dec 20, 2024. A dated scenario, not a live 2028 reading or the latest forecast. TWh measures energy consumed; GW measures power capacity. No comparable live buildout series is included yet.
Federal Reserve and Nvidia feeds are checked every six hours when the site is visited; the page checks the cache every five minutes. Failed checks preserve the previous value and its verification date.
04 / WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE VIEW?
Research questions for serious readers; these are not endorsements by named experts.
Compare incremental cash earnings with investment, depreciation, and financing costs. Add valuation and credit spreads before calling this a market-bubble index.
Missing testPoint-in-time, broad-cohort comparisons with failed firms and other investment cycles.
Track retained paid usage, inference cost per useful task, utilization, and gross profit after serving costs. Benchmark gains alone cannot establish returns.
Missing testComparable lab unit economics and independent measures of customer value.
Follow customer concentration, enforceable guarantees, debt maturities, chip resale values, and delivered power. Announcements are not operating capacity.
Missing testContract-level obligations, refinancing exposure, and energized versus idle MW.
THE DEMAND SIDE
of surveyed organizations reported using AI in 2025. Adoption is not paid revenue or proof of profitable deployment.
Stanford AI Index 2026Annual snapshot · Separate fundamental contextTHE CAPABILITY SIDE
OSWorld computer-use benchmark accuracy in 2025, up from about 12%. A task benchmark, not economy-wide productivity.
Stanford technical performanceAnnual snapshot · Separate fundamental contextKNOW THE BLIND SPOTS
A real technology boom can coexist with financial overinvestment. This beta measures one part of that story.
WHAT TO WATCH NEXT
Watch capex guidance, cash-flow coverage, and margins in the next reports. New financial facts flow into the dashboard automatically.
Follow SEC releases